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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies two wide ranging phenomena and their socio-economic
impacts: urban divergence in terms of geographical skill sorting and fast rising
housing prices. The first essay explores the empirical pattern as well as the driv-
ing forces behind the American cities’ diverging path over the past forty years.
Compared to the rest of the U.S. cities, the top 20 largest cities have been growing
faster in several aspects, such as city-average wage, housing price, and measured
innovation intensity (e.g., patents, venture capital). In addition, this geographi-
cal divergence has contributed substantially to the rising inequality in America.
To explore the causes of this divergence, this paper constructs a spatial sorting
model where entrepreneurs with di erent talents can freely move across cities. The
key idea is that cities with advantages in innovation attract more productive en-
trepreneurs and more workers, thereby driving up wages and housing prices. Two
things distinguish my models from others: 1. Large cities are having endogenous
innovation advantage in equilibrium; 2. I can freely explore the driving forces
behind the divergence, with an emphasis on how technology changes can reinforce
the spatial sorting mechanism. Specifically, three types of technological changes
have increased the benefits of skill clustering in innovative cities: general produc-
tivity increases; improvements in communications technologies; and declines in
trade costs.
The second essay studies how heterogeneous households respond to the fast
rising housing prices through their life-cycle behaviors. Chinese housing market
has been undergoing a rapid booming period since 1998, causing the house prices
increasing significantly. As a result, households endured severe financial burdens
to buy homes at price-to-income ratios of around six. Along with the rising house
prices, household savings rate has been increasing consistently since 1998. Can
the rising house prices be an important factor to explain the increase in household
i
saving rate? This paper develops a life cycle dynastic model with endogenous
choice on housing, coresidence and intergenerational transfer, then quantitatively
analyze the e ect of housing price on household saving. It shows that housing is
an important motive for saving, and it accounts for about 35% of the increase in
household savings rate. The housing situation a ects households’ saving behavior
through three channels. First, households are financially constrained due to the
down payment requirement and they choose to limit their consumption in order to
buy houses. Second, young adults live in their parents’ houses for a long time and
save more intensively, since they get to pay less for the housing expenses under
coresidence. Thirdly, older parents make large sum of intergeneration transfer in
aid of the children’s housing purchase, indicating the housing a ordability issue
also has influence on old parents’ saving decisions.
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Chapter 1
Unequal Cities: Innovation, Skill Sorting and Inequality
1.1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, the spatial distribution of skills have become in-
creasingly more dispersed, with the robust feature that the initially skilled cities
are becoming more and more skilled1. The process of di erently skilled individuals
being sorted into di erent cities is called spatial sorting. The direct result of spatial
sorting is the phenomenon some refer to as “the Great Divergence” among Amer-
ican cities. Successful cities have attracted more and more highly-talented people
and enabled them to work collaboratively. Meanwhile, these cities are experienc-
ing higher population, wage and housing price growth than the rest of cities. With
the fast advancement in technology, people’s capability for long-distance commu-
nication and shipping goods over long distances have vastly improved. Therefore
the need for spatial concentration should have decreased. However, exactly the
opposite is happening in the real world. Behind this increased trend of skill sort-
ing and urban inequality, lies a puzzling question. Why do people, especially the
most talented people, keep moving towards large cities, without regard to their
extremely high living costs?
In modern society, the role of cities in accelerating the flow of technology and
ideas has taken a central place. The geographic density provided by cities brings
people together, and this proximity stimulates idea spread and enables collabora-
tion. Talented people cluster not simply because they like each other’s company
1Many papers have studied this phenomenon, such as Goldin and Katz (2007), Ganong and
Shoag (2016), Moretti (2012) and Diamond (2016).
1
or they prefer urban centers with far superior amenities, but because they can
enjoy productive advantages and knowledge spillovers that such concentrations
bring. As of 2013, about 53% of the top 5% earners in U.S. metropolitan areas are
located in the top 20 large cities. This is an increase from 39% in 19802. Mean-
while, there is unprecedented concentration of innovation activities happening in
these cities. About half of the new product innovations in the 1980s occurred in
just four metropolitan areas: Boston, New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles3.
And almost all VC investments were made in major cities, see figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Spatial concentration of US patenting and venture capital
Note: VC calculations use the share of deals over the 1990-2005 period. Patent calcu-
lations use the share of granted patents applied for from each city during 1990–2005.
The population share is from 1999. The figure is taken from Chatterji et al. (2014).
Source data are from VentureXpert, USPTO patent data, and county level population
statistics.
To explain the increasing trend of spatial skill sorting and innovation concen-
2The metropolitan population share in these 20 cities have increased from 22% in 1980 to
29% in 2013.
3This empirical findings about spatial concentration of the commercialization of innovation
can be found in Feldman and Audretsch (1999). For R&D activity, Buzard and Carlino (2013)
showed that the spatial concentration of establishments undertaking R&D is more pronounced
than firms.
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tration, this paper formulates a multi-city model of innovation and production.
The model allows for two types of agents: production workers and entrepreneurs.
Production workers are kept relatively simple: they simply produce and con-
sume. Entrepreneurs are monopolistic competitors who di er in productivity4.
Entrepreneurs run firms and innovate, which increases their productivity. If an
entrepreneur decides to innovate, he pays a cost in return for a random produc-
tivity draw from the entrepreneurial productivity distribution of the aggregate
economy.
Both workers and entrepreneurs choose which of two cities to live and work
in. The cities are identical except that one (generically, the first city) has an en-
dowed advantage in aiding innovation. I think of this policy as capturing rules,
regulations, and the endowment of complementary inputs such as input suppliers,
universities, and so on5. This endowed advantage of the first city is balanced by
congestion costs that are in equilibrium stronger, inducing a non-trivial sorting
problem. Every entrepreneur wants to live in the city with better innovation en-
vironment, since it o ers them the best chance to improve their productivities.
But only the more talented ones are able to survive the competition. The com-
plementarity between agglomeration economies—innovation in this paper—and
entrepreneurs’ productivity leads to the sorting of more skilled entrepreneurs into
larger cities. In equilibrium, they invest more resources on innovation and pay
4The setting of entrepreneurs are similar to that of the standard heterogenous firm model in
Merlitz (2003).
5Traditional discussions of natural advantages focus on geographic features such as harbors
and coal mines. The rise of New York in the early nineteenth century is the result of its central
location and protected harbor which made it the natural hub of shipping and immigration
system. But, the technology advancement has rendered these geographic features less relevant
over time. Bleakley and Lin (2012) believed that the early developed cities have some long-
lived assets that could coordinate contemporary investment and cause a persistent e ect. Apart
from these, factors such as local policies or proximity to universities and financial institutes can
be important as well. For instance, some believe Silicon Valley and Boston became important
centers for innovation in part because of their proximity to Stanford University and MIT (Lee
and Nicholas, 2013). And the lack of “noncompete and nondisclosure clauses” policy do set
California apart from other states. The “noncompete and nondisclosure clauses” restrict workers
from starting new businesses that could possibly in direct competition with their old employers.
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higher wages to workers. In summation, the interactions between innovation, sort-
ing, and agglomeration economies shape the income distribution and exacerbate
inequality across cities of di erent sizes.
I start by showing that the model equilibrium allows us to understand the facts
outlined above. The large city attracts more talented entrepreneurs who inno-
vate more, leading to a higher average productivity. Those more productive en-
trepreneurs pay higher wages, which then attract more workers to city 1. This
establishes a link between productivity and city size. On the other hand, the ag-
glomeration forces are inevitably met with congestion forces: higher housing prices
and negative amenity caused by overcrowding. Furthermore, this model generates
two straightforward implications on spatial inequality. First, the productivity pre-
mium of the large city, resulted from skill sorting and intense innovation, leads
to a wage gap across cities. Second, the large city is more unequal comparing to
the small one, because entrepreneurs in large city benefit the most from both the
superior innovation environment and larger market share.
Next, I use the comparative statics of the model to establish some insights on
possible driving forces behind the increased sorting by cities over the last fifty
years. In particular, I show that a simple exogenous rise in total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) can induce stronger skill sorting. Whenever aggregate TFP rises, every
city becomes more productive, indicating that every city’s wage and housing price
will rise as well. But the average wage and housing price in in large city increase
more, thus leading to a tough selection. In response, the marginal entrepreneurs
in large city will be better o  moving to small city, which then raises both city’s
productivity. But the productivity in big city disproportionately increases more
because of the complementarity between innovation and entrepreneurial produc-
tivity. In this paper, the aggregate TFP is described by the distribution of en-
trepreneurs’ productivity. Since productivity follows a Pareto distribution in the
4
model, an increase in TFP can be proxied by an increase in the minimum pro-
ductivity threshold, which e ectively depicts the catching up of the least talented
entrepreneurs in small cities (Tonetti and Perla, 2014). Due to the fat tail prop-
erty of Pareto distribution, the productivity in large city actually increase more.
Therefore, the equilibrium productivity and wage gaps across di erent sized cities
grow over time.
In the baseline model, the result of perfect skill sorting hinges on the assumption
that one city has exogenous innovation advantage. One way to remedy this is to
include localized knowledge spillover e ect. In section 1.4, I extend the model
by assuming that cities have no fundamental di erences, instead the process of
innovation is slightly altered. Now knowledge spread is more likely to occur if
agents live in the same place, since face-to-face meeting is more e ective in idea
exchange. The most talented entrepreneurs choose the same city, which in equi-
librium becomes the large city. The relatively less talented entrepreneurs, on the
other hand, cannot a ord to live in the big cities due to its higher cost.
In addition, as information technology (internet, email, video chat) has changed
the way people interact with each other, so it is interesting to analyze how these
telecommunications a ect the value of cities as well as the pattern of skill sort-
ing. Depending on whether information technology and city are complement or
substitute with each other6, the e ects vary. If they are complement, telecom-
munications improve big cities innovation environment to a greater degree, thus
the value of big city increases. As a result, more and more relatively unskilled
individuals will move towards big cities. On the other hand, if they are substi-
tute, telecommunications improve small cities innovation environment to a greater
6According to Gaspar and Glaeser (1996), when telecommunications technology improves,
there are two opposing e ects on cities and face-to-face interactions: some relationships that
used to be face-to-face will be done electronically (an intuitive substitution e ect), and some
individuals will choose to make more face-to-face contacts(an complementary e ect). So far,
there is no consensus on this subject.
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degree, and the relatively unskilled individuals will move towards small cities in-
stead.
Lastly, I study how inter-regional trade a ects the composition of skill as well
as income distribution across cities. I extend the model by including bilateral
trade. The results suggest that skill sorting and inequality become greater with
the decline of iceberg trade costs. Intuitively, entrepreneurs in big cities benefit
more from trade due to the asymmetrical trade costs. A decrease in trade costs
disproportionately increases the market size as well as wage in large cities. These
changes are more beneficial to the more productive entrepreneurs than to the less
productive ones. Therefore, the least talented entrepreneurs, originally living in
large cities, will be better o  moving to small cities instead. In equilibrium, spatial
skill sorting becomes stronger in response to trade costs decrease. As a result, the
productivity as well as wage gaps become wider.
Overall, the model proved to be tractable enough to study the multi-factor spa-
tial equilibrium system. It o ers some insights on what caused the geographic
divergence among American cities with respect to productivity, wage and inequal-
ity, and what factors contribute to the deeper and growing trend in spatial skill
sorting. In addition, I also stress the role of TFP increase and trade in increasing
the relevant market size, which reinforces skill sorting, sustains larger and more
productive cities.
1.1.1 Related Literature
There are three strands of literature closely related to this paper. The first
relevant literature is about the cross-sectional skill sorting across cities (Behrens
and Robert-Nicoud (2014); Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014); Eeck-
hout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014); Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
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and Shleifer (2013)). Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014) developed
a multi-city model that explained the complementarities between skill sorting,
occupation selection, and agglomeration economies. They successfully replicated
the stylized facts about sorting, agglomeration, and selection in cities. The main
force of agglomeration in their model comes from scale e ect: the entrepreneurial
productivity gain increases with city population size. This approach proves to
be e ective in analyzing city’s cross sectional skill sorting and size distribution.
Plus the selection of entrepreneurs within each city provides plenty of productiv-
ity overlapping across cities, which is a nice feature, because in real world skill
sorting is imperfect. This paper is built on their framework, and it has one major
di erence: the productive advantage (or innovation advantage) of large cities is
allow to be endogenous.
The second relevant literature is focuses on localized knowledge spillover e ects
on individuals’ spatial choices (Henderson (1974); Duranton and Puga (2004)).
Knowledge spillover is directly related to the acquisition of skills and the learning
of new technologies, hence it is one of the most important mechanisms giving rise
to agglomeration economies. Most recently, Davis and Dingel (2016) developed
a spatial equilibrium framework to show why skill premiums are higher in large
cities. Similar to this paper, they believed that localized idea exchange is the
main agglomeration force and large cities have better idea-exchange environments.
Compared to their paper, this paper not only can answer the question why large
cities are capable of attracting more skilled labor force cross-sectionally, but also
can answer the question what are the driving forces behind the great divergence
across cities over the past three decades.
Lastly, there are a number of papers discussing innovation, economic growth and
inequality (Lucas and Moll (2014); Perla and Tonetti (2014); Perla, Tonetti, and
Waugh (2016); Gabaix et al. (2016) and Jones and Kim (2017)). Lucas and Moll
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Table 1.1: Skill Composition Changes between 1990 and 2010
Share of College (Including Above) Share of Above College
Small City Big City Small City Big City
1990 19.82% 24.99% 2000 7.57% 8.72%
2010 25.91% 32.78% 2010 8.21% 10.91%
Growth 6.09% 7.79% Growth 0.64% 2.19%
(Note: Small city refers to MSAs with less or equal to 1 million population, whereas big
city refers to the ones with more than 1 million population.)
(2014) explored a model of human capital and ideas exchange that gives rise to
endogenous growth. Aghion et al. (2017) showed that innovation and top income
inequality are positively correlated within U.S. states and across U.S. commuting
zones. Jones and Kim (2017) developed a model in which entrepreneurs expend
e ort to increase their productivities while new entrants replace incumbents in a
process of creative destruction generates a Pareto distribution for top incomes.
It suggests economic forces that raise top income inequality: forces that increase
the return of fast-growing entrepreneurs’ innovation e ort. Their findings can be
reconciled with this paper. Empirically, top earners exhibit a geographic pattern,
with the richest disproportionally locating in large cities. This paper suggests that
the complementarity between top entrepreneurs’ innovation e ort and locational
fundamentals lead to the spatial pattern of innovation concentration as well as top
income inequality.
1.2 Motivating Evidence
Empirical evidence that motivating this paper is that big cities have higher
productive advantages for firms, and higher income premium for workers. It is
even better if there are evidence to suggest that the main benefits of living in big
cities come from knowledge spillover e ect.
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la Roca and Puga (2017) was an important empirical study of the positive re-
lationship between city size and labor income as well as income growth. They
studied Spain’s labor market by cities, and found that workers in big cities not
only have higher earnings, they also have higher growth rates in earnings. The
interpretation of income growth is human capital accumulation through experi-
ence. Their result indicates that the experience accumulated in bigger cities is
substantially more valuable than experience accumulated in smaller cities, and
these experience is even more valuable for workers with higher ability. And it di-
rectly prove that there are important learning benefits to working in bigger cities
which is embedded in workers’ human capital. The implication of their analysis
is an important premise for this paper: the advantages of living in big cities come
from the opportunities they provide for individuals to learn from others, and the
learning benefit is greater for people with higher abilities.
Figure 1.2: Share of Top 5% Earners Located in Big Cities
Note: Calculations are based on US Census Bureau data for 366 MSAs between
1980 and 2013. The figure plots the share of top 5% earners locating in sub-
grouped cities out of MSAs.
There are many ways that make cities di erent: size, productivity and living
cost. But most fundamentally, cities di er in the composition of human capital.
9
Figure 1.3: Income Inequality and Wage Gap
Fig. a: Income Ratio between top 5% and bottom 25% Figure b: City Average Hourly Wage (Dollar)
In recent literature, skill sorting has been a robust feature from the data. Accord-
ing to Combes et al. (2008), human capital composition di erences across cities
can explain up to 40–50% of the size-productivity relationship. Table 1.1 shows
that the share of skilled labor force in big cities is disproportionately higher. Ad-
ditionally, the increase of skilled labor share in big cities between 1990 and 2010
is greater than that of small cities, implying that skill sorting indeed becomes
stronger over time. Another way to examine the pattern of skill sorting is to check
the share of top talents located in di erent sized city. If income is a good indi-
cator for individual skill/talent, figure 2.1 shows that the share of most talented
population (proxied by top 5% earners in all the MSAs) in big cities are increasing
over year. The increasing share of top earners in big cities might come from two
channels: rich people moving into big cities or the income growth of top earners in
big cities is greater than that of the rest of places. This paper intends to explore
what forces have caused the upward trend in skill sorting, and analyze the direct
consequences of increasing sorting on urban inequality.
City size is not only correlated with labor force skill composition, it is also
correlated with inequality in economic outcomes. The fact that large cities are
more unequal is a robust feature of the data, and it has been discussed in papers,
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like Glaeser et al. (2009) and Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013). There are two aspects
of urban inequality concerned in this paper, which are shown in figure 1.3 : wage
inequality across cities (right panel) and top income inequality within cities (left
panel). Skill sorting, interacting with agglomeration force, has significant e ect
on wage inequality across di erent sized cities. Meanwhile, the force that induced
skill sorting, innovation or knowledge spillover, plays a more direct role in top
income inequality. The most talented entrepreneurs who are sorted into big cities
benefit more from innovative activities, thus allowing them disproportionately the
top earnings.
1.3 The Simple Model
This section describes and solves the multi-city theoretical framework. The
premise of this model is similar to Behrens et al. (2014) and Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2014). There are two types of agents: worker and entrepreneur. Agents
live for one period, and they are free to move across cities. In particular, they have
preferences over good consumption and housing. I will describe the production
and agent decisions in turn.
1.3.1 City
This paper considers an economy with two cities j œ {1, 2}. There is a fixed
housing supply, H¯j, which is owned by landlords who only consume final consump-
tion goods. Aside from housing supply, cities are di erent with respect to only
one locational characteristic: the first city (generically) has an endowed advan-
tage in aiding innovation. The innovation advantage of city 1 is going to play an
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important role in what type of agents are going to be sorted into each city.
1.3.2 Agent’s Problem
As introduced above, the economy includes two types of agents: workers and
entrepreneurs. There are L identical workers, who consume and produce. And
there is a continuum of entrepreneurs of mass œ, who di er in productivity. Each
entrepreneur is a monopolist who produces a di erentiated intermediate good.
Based on productivity, entrepreneurs choose where to locate. After moving into
a city, they can also innovate, which allows them to produce their variety more
productively.
1.3.2.1 Worker’s Problem
All workers are endowed with one unit of labor, which they supply inelastically.
In each city, workers’ total income is equal to the nominal wage, which is spent on
final consumption good (serving as numeraire) and housing. The utility function
for a worker facing wage wj and housing price Phj in city j is Cobb-Douglas form
7:
UW (j) = max
Cj,Hj
A
Cj
µ
Bµ A
Hj
1≠ µ
B1≠µ
≠ aj;
s.t. Cj + PhjHj = wj. (1.3.1)
7For empirical evidence using U.S. data in support of the constant housing expenditure share
implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form, see Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011).
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where Cj represents final goods consumption, Hj represents housing consump-
tion, and aj is city-specific congestion amenity. In this paper, congestion amenity
refers to the amenities resulting from overcrowding8, such as long commuting
time, pollution, crime, or simply the di culty to find a parking space. Because
agents are perfectly mobile across cities, and all workers are ex-ante identical by
assumption, then workers will be indi erent between living in two cities.
1.3.2.2 Entrepreneur’s Problem
The entrepreneur’s preference is similar to that of worker. The major di erence
is that entrepreneurs earn profits by providing intermediate variety, whereas work-
ers earn nominal wages. Because innovation is a random process, so entrepreneur’s
profit is uncertain. But, I can still define the expected utility of entrepreneur i,
who chooses to live in city j and has an initial productivity z:
U ei (j, z) = maxCji,Hji
A
Cji
µ
Bµ A
Hji
1≠ µ
B1≠µ
≠ aj; (1.3.2)
s.t. Cji + PhjHji =  ji (z) .
Where  ji (z) stands for expected net profit, which is the result of endogenous
choices on location, innovation and production decisions. In the next section,
8This model assumes that congestion amenity is fixed, rather than an increasing function
of population size. If I adopt a di erent approach, such that aj = Lflj , with fl representing the
congestion elasticity w.r.t city population. I can still solve the model, except it is more di cult.
The literature on the estimates of congestion elasticity fl is quite sparse, so far, I am only aware
of Combes et al. (2016). In Duranton et al. (2015), they believed that this congestion elasticity
should be very small, which is close to 2%. However, the congestion cost in their definition mostly
includes land and housing prices. In this paper, the congestion force resulted from housing price
is included in variable Phj . Therefore, the congestion elasticity in this paper should be even
smaller, which indicates that as city’s population size increases, its congestion amenity increases
but only very barely.
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the setup of entrepreneur’s production and innovation problems are introduced in
detail.
1.3.3 Production
The structure of production within a city is a two-step process: intermediate
goods and final output good. In each city there is a final good producer that
supplies the final output good competitively. The final good is produced by ag-
gregating the mass of intermediate varieties that are provided by monopolistically
competitive entrepreneurs. And it serves as numeraire in both cities, thus its
price is set to 1. The final good producer chooses the quantity to purchase of each
variety:
max
yji
Aˆ
iœœj
y◊jidi
B 1
◊
, 0 < ◊ < 1 (1.3.3)
s.t.
ˆ
iœœj
pjiyjidi = Yj.
where ‡ = 11≠◊ is the elasticity of substitution; yji is the amount of intermediate
good i used for final good production in city j, pji is the price of intermediate good
i, and Yj is the aggregate output of the final consumption good. The measure œj
defines the endogenous mass of entrepreneurs who choose to live and produce in
city j. Entrepreneurs have claims on the net profits from selling varieties. The
more productive entrepreneurs are more e cient in engaging production activity,
thus having higher profits. (Thinking about the order of these things)
The interpretation of entrepreneur is not quite so literal. They are, in general,
talented entrepreneurial types. They can be Silicon Valley startups, software
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engineers, successful authors, or doctors with new techniques. Every entrepreneur
faces three choices: where to live, how much to innovate, and how much to produce.
The model is solved in a backward fashion, thus both production and innovation
decisions are operated on the premise that entrepreneurs already choosing the
optimal location. In intermediate goods production, labor is the only input. The
output for intermediate good i in city j is given by:
yji = (qji)“ lji, (1.3.4)
where lji is the labor demanded to produce intermediate good i, and qji is
entrepreneur’s realized productivity after innovation. I assume for the rest of the
paper: “ = 1≠◊◊ =
1
‡≠1 , with ‡ Ø 1 . Note that this is just a simplifying assumption
which makes profits a linear function of productivity qji. It can be relaxed with a
bit more algebra. Because all the labor resource is used to produce intermediate
goods, then the labor market constraint is :
L1 + L2 = L; Lj =
ˆ
iœœj
ljidi. (1.3.5)
It means that out of the aggregate population L, there are L1 workers choosing
city 1 and L2 workers choosing city 2 in equilibrium. Next I introduce the process
of innovation. Entrepreneurs need to decide whether and how much to invest in
innovation.
1.3.4 Innovation
Entrepreneurs have di erentiated productivity, which can be understood as their
skill level or talent. Each entrepreneur is identified by a draw of productivity z
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from a Pareto distribution G(·), which is described by its cumulative distribution
function (cdf) Pr (z > zmin) = 1≠
1
zmin
z
2–
; where zmin is the minimum productivity
threshold, and – is the Pareto tail parameter governing dispersion.
Upon choosing a location, each entrepreneur can improve his productivity through
buying a chance of a new draw from distribution G(·). This innovation process can
be understood as people learning from one another, which is similar to the inter-
pretation in Lucas and Moll (2014)9. On the other hand, it can also be thought of
as tangible or intangible investments that manifest themselves as improvements in
productivity such as improved production practices, work practices, management
practices, etc. see discussions in Holmes and Schmitz (2010).
Similar to the set-up of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014), an entrepreneur i
with initial productivity z in city j can decide to buy a probability „ji Æ 1 of
innovating at cost Â(„ji | z), which is paid out of the profit from selling variety.
This process dictates that entrepreneur obtains an innovation with probability „ji,
and with probability (1 ≠ „ji) his productivity is not a ected by the investment
in innovation. The entrepreneur who obtains a chance to innovate draws a new
skill z+ from distribution G(z). The new productivity is adopted if it is higher
than the initial productivity, z+ > z; if not, entrepreneur will operate at his initial
productivity level z. Then the expected productivity conditional on the initial z
is:
E
1
z+ | z, innovation
2
=
ˆ Œ
zmin
max {x, z} dG(x) = –z
–≠ 1;
The added “plus” superscript refers to the productivity after the innovation
decision. The expected productivity for entrepreneur i (with initial productivity
9In the baseline model, an entrepreneur in city 1 can improve his productivity by learning
from entrepreneurs in city 2, without occurring extra innovation cost than he learns from those
locating in the same city. An extended model of localized knowledge spillover is introduced in
section 4, in which learning from distant cities is more costly than learning within the same city.
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z) is:
qji (z) = „ji
ˆ Œ
z
xdG(x)¸ ˚˙ ˝
expected productivity if innovate
+ (1≠ „ji) z¸ ˚˙ ˝
innovation not occur
(1.3.6)
Finally, I make some assumptions on the primitives of the model. I assume that
the innovation cost function Ï („ji | z) :
ˆÏ („ji | z)
ˆ„ji
> 0 and ˆÏ
2 („ji | z)
ˆ„2ji
> 0 for „ji œ (0, 1).
and for any z Ø zmin:
Ï („1i | z) < Ï („2i | z) . (1.3.7)
These two assumptions make sure that for any given productivity z: (i) the
innovation cost is a convex function of innovation opportunity „ji, so that there is
no corner solution problem; (ii) the innovation cost required in city 1 is lower than
that in city 2, which is basically stating that the first city has endowed innovation
advantage.
Before the model is solved, I need to formally define the spatial equilibrium.
Given initial productivity distribution G(z), city-specific innovation advantage ‰j and
housing supply H¯j , a spatial equilibrium is a set of real functions {Phj , wj , Cj , Hj , lji,
„ji, Yj , Qj , Lj , œj} of city j and entrepreneur i, such that:
• Given city-specific wage wj and house price Phj , workers choose consumption
bundle {Cj , Hj}, and then locate optimally by solving problem (1.3.1);
• Ex-ante identical workers are indi erent between two cities, and the indi er-
ence condition leads to city’s labor supply Lj, which is expressed in (1.4.12);
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• Entrepreneurs choose optimal location by solving problem (1.3.2), and the
mass of entrepreneurs choosing city j is characterized by  j ;
• Given initial productivity z and location choice, each entrepreneur chooses
innovation opportunity „ji by solving problem (1.4.1);
• Given city’s wage wj, each entrepreneur chooses the number of workers lji
to maximize profit;
• City’s productivityQj is the average productivity of the mass of entrepreneurs
 j choosing city j, its expression is given in (1.4.10);
• The model assumes that the aggregate housing value is a constant share (⁄)
of the aggregate output Yj10. Given housing price Phj, the housing market
clearing condition is H¯jPhj = ⁄Yj;
• Labor market clear, so Lj satisfied condition (1.3.5).
1.4 Model Results
Because an entrepreneur’s decisions are rather complicated, I summarize them
into four steps, which then serve as a roadmap for the actual solution process.
Since I solve the model in a backward fashion, the process is as following:
1. Given city’s wage wj, entrepreneurs choose the optimal labor demand lji to
maximize the expected profit E (fiji | z) from selling varieties. The detailed
steps for solving the expected profit E (fiji | z) is given in appendix A1.
2. Second, given initial productivity z and location j, entrepreneur i chooses
10The assumptions on land market is similar to Davis and Nieuwerburgh (2014) and Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg (016b).
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innovation opportunity „ji to maximize the expected net profit  ji (z):
 ji (z) = max
„ji
E (fiji | z)≠ Ï („ji | z) ; (1.4.1)
3. Third, with the expected net profit  ji (z), entrepreneur i solves the con-
sumption maximization problem described in (1.3.2), and get optimized ex-
pected utility U ei (j, z).
4. Lastly, to decide the optimal location, he just needs to choose the city with
higher utility:
max
jœ{1,2}
U ei (j, z). (1.4.2)
For an entrepreneur with initial productivity z, if U ei (1, z) > U ei (2, z), he chooses
city 1; if U ei (1, z) < U ei (2, z), he chooses city 2; if U ei (1, z) = U ei (2, z), he is
indi erent between living in two cities;
1.4.1 Optimal Innovation Choice
Having defined the equilibrium behavior of agents and the structure of the model.
I can now describe the equilibrium properties. First, the city-specific wage, aggre-
gate output, and profits are given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: (Output, Wages, and Profits): Let wj denote the wage rate in
city j, and let fiji denote the profit earned by entrepreneur i before innovation cost
is paid. The equilibrium with monopolistic competition leads to
wj = ◊Q“j (1.4.3)
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Yj = Q“jLj. (1.4.4)
E (fiji | z) = (1≠◊)Yj qji (z)
Qj
. (1.4.5)
where Qj =
´
iœœj z
+
jidi is the mean productivity across entrepreneurs locating in
city j.
See proof in appendix A1. According to proposition 1, entrepreneur’s individ-
ual profit from selling variety is proportional to local aggregate output, Yj, and
relative productivity, qji(z)Qj . Here Qj represents city’s average productivity, and
its definition is: Qj =
´
œj
qji (z) dz. As introduced in section 1.3.4, innovation
improves entrepreneur’s productivity, and it happens with a chance „ji, which
is endogenously determined by weighing the benefit and the cost of innovation.
According to function (1.3.6), the expected productivity after innovation is:
qji (z) = „ji
–z
–≠ 1 + (1≠ „ji) z (1.4.6)
=
A
„ji + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
¸ ˚˙ ˝
scale of innovation
z.
The above expression indicates that the benefit of innovation comes from the
elevation of initial productivity z. And the scale of elevation, „ji+–≠1–≠1 , solely
depends on innovation opportunity „ji and Pareto tail parameter –. Now, it is
time to solve entrepreneur’s optimal innovation opportunity. To do that, I need
to give the specific functional form for innovation cost:
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Ï („ji | z) = ‰jwjLj1≠ „ji
z
Qj
; (1.4.7)
where ‰j represents city-specific innovation e ciency parameter: smaller ‰j im-
plies better innovation environment. To be consistent with the assumption that
city 1 has a better innovation environment compared to city 2, I let ‰1 < ‰211.
Note that the innovation cost function is also increasing in city-specific wage (wj),
population size (Li) and relative productivity zQj . The increasing relationship be-
tween innovation cost and aggregate labor income wjLj is to capture the labor
cost in innovation12. Meanwhile, the more productive entrepreneurs are closer to
technology frontier, thus have little room to improve, which is why their innovation
cost is higher.
As we can see, innovation opportunity „ji is crucial in determining entrepreneur’s
location choice, since it governs the scale of productivity improvement from innova-
tion. To determine the optimal innovation opportunity, entrepreneur i maximizes
his expected net profit  ji (z). The solution of innovation decision gives rise to
the following expression:
„ji = 1≠
A
‰j (–≠ 1)
“
B1/2
= „új (1.4.8)
Because every entrepreneur in the same city has the same innovation opportunity,
hence the expected productivity for entrepreneur i in city j is:
qji (z) =
SU –
–≠ 1 ≠
A
‰j
“ (–≠ 1)
B1/2TV
¸ ˚˙ ˝
scale of improvement
z. (1.4.9)
11The rationale for one of the city having better innovation environment can be found in
footnote 6.
12In equilibrium, the aggregate labor income wjLj is proportional to the aggregate output,
i.e. Yj = wjLj◊ . Then the defined innovation cost function indicates that innovation investment
is proportional to entrepreneurial profit, since they are both proportional to local aggregate
output.
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This indicates that the productivity improvement from innovation is proportional,
and the scale of improvement in city 1 is higher than city 2. Using the above
expression, I can get city-specific average productivity:
Qj =
ˆ
œj
A
„új + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
zjidi =
SU –
–≠ 1 ≠
A
‰j
“ (–≠ 1)
B1/2TV z¯j. (1.4.10)
where z¯j =
´
iœœj zjidi is the mean of initial productivity from the mass of en-
trepreneurs œj choosing to locate in city j. If the the mass of entrepreneurs choos-
ing city j are relatively more productive, city j is more productive. Meanwhile,
city’s average productivity increases with the innovation e ciency parameter 1/‰j,
which is quite intuitive. Since the better the innovation environment (lower ‰j) is
in a city, the more incentive entrepreneurs have to invest in innovation, as a result
the scale of productivity improvement will be larger.
1.4.2 Equilibrium Spatial Sorting
This model involves two types of agents: worker and entrepreneur. Naturally,
spatial sorting refers to the process both types deciding their optimal locations. I
will start with worker’s location choice first, since it is fairly easy.
1.4.2.1 The Sorting of Workers
Given city-specific housing price and wage, worker solves utility maximization
problem defined in problem (1.3.1). With constant expenditure shares on final
good and housing, worker’s indirect utility function becomes:
UW (j) = wj
P 1≠µhj
≠ aj.
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The first part of the indirect utility function wj
p1≠µhj
represents the real income af-
ter adjusting housing cost, the second part aj represents the congestion amenity.
Clearly, worker’s location choice is determined by city’s nominal wage and living
cost, which includes housing price and local amenity. This simple utility form is
able to accommodate a number of regional di erences. The two cities di er in
their relative productivity, with more productive city having higher nominal wage
and higher housing price. In equilibrium, ex-ante identical workers are indi er-
ent between living in two cities. Hence, worker’s indirect utility function UW (j)
equalizes:
w1
p1≠µ1j
≠ a1 = w2
p1≠µh2
≠ a2 = uú, (1.4.11)
where uú is the equilibrium common utility level. This indi erence condition
clearly states the tradeo  for choosing between two cities: the higher nominal
wage in large city must be balanced out by a higher living cost. Using the hous-
ing market clearance condition H¯jPhj = ⁄Yj, house price can be expressed as a
function of wage wj and local population Lj:
Phj =
⁄Yj
H¯j
= ⁄wjLj
◊H¯j
.
Let ÷j = ⁄◊H¯j , then parameter 1/÷j can be perceived as land supply coe cient:
city’s fixed housing supply H¯j is more restricted when ÷j is higher. Replacing Phj
with ÷jwjLj in the indi erence equation (1.4.11), the equilibrium labor supply in
city j is
Lj =
w
µ
1≠µ
j
÷j(uú + aj)
1
1≠µ
. (1.4.12)
Equation (1.4.12) represents the labor supply in city j, which is increasing in city’s
wage rate, decreasing in land supply coe cient ÷j and congestion amenity aj.
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1.4.2.2 The Sorting of Entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur’s sorting problem is similar to that of the worker’s. Each en-
trepreneur decides where to live based on three factors: expected entrepreneurial
income, housing price and city-specific congestion amenity. With the optimal in-
novation opportunity expressed in (4.8), the equilibrium expected net profit is:
 ji (z) = E (fiji | z)≠ Ï
1
„új | z
2
= ≈jz, (1.4.13)
where ≈j = (1 ≠ ◊)
5
–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
‰j
“(–≠1)
21/26 Yj
Qj
summarizes the benefit of an en-
trepreneur choosing city j, which is increasing in city’s aggregate output Yj and
innovation e ciency parameter 1/‰j. With entrepreneur’s expected net profit
as well as city’s housing price, I can easily write out the optimal indirect utility
function:
U ei (j, z) =
≈j
P 1≠µhj
z ≠ aj =  j (Qj) z ≠ aj; (1.4.14)
in which
 j (Qj) z =
1
÷j
A
◊
uú + aj
B µ
1≠µ
SU “–
(–≠ 1) ≠ 2
A
“‰j
(–≠ 1)
B1/2TVQ “µ+µ≠11≠µj z
representing entrepreneur’s expected real income after adjusting housing price. We
can see there is a linear relationship between the expected real income and initial
productivity z, indicating that the real income is higher in a more productive city.
The reason for this is as following. On the one hand, a city is more productive if the
mass of entrepreneurs in that city are on average more productive. On the other
hand, entrepreneurs in city 1 benefit more from innovation, because they have
higher innovation opportunity due to the endowed advantage. Moreover, the most
talented entrepreneurs benefit the most from living in city 1. Therefore, there
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exists a complementarity between innovation and productivity. In equilibrium,
this complementarity is the driving force for agglomeration economy under this
framework.
Due to the linearity between entrepreneur’s indirect utility function U ei (j, z)
and his productivity z, there exists an unique skill threshold z¯ > 0, such that
entrepreneur with initial productivity higher than z¯ choosing to live in the more
innovative city (city 1), and entrepreneurs with initial productivity lower than
z¯ choosing to live in city 213. When city-specific amenities are unequal to each
other, namely a1 > a2, the solution of above equation leads to the threshold for
skill sorting:
z¯ = a1 ≠ a2 1 (Q1)≠ 2 (Q2) . (1.4.15)
If this skill sorting threshold is larger than the minimum level zmin of the initial
productivity distribution G(·), z¯ > zmin14, there exists an unique spatial equilib-
rium characterized by perfect skill sorting. In addition, this equilibrium sorting
result is e cient, because the most skilled entrepreneurs end up living in the city
with innovation advantage that promote economic development. The following
proposition states the existence and uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium. See
proof in appendix A2.
Proposition 2: (Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness): Assume a1 > a2, ‰1 <
‰2 and “µ+µ≠1 > 0. There exists an unique equilibrium with perfect skill sorting:
13When city-specific amenities are equal to each other, a1 = a2, the indi erence condition
indicates that  1 (Q1) =  2 (Q2), suggesting that all entrepreneur are indi erent between two
cities. Essentially, two cities bring people the same real income and the same amenity. So cites
are rather symmetric. This equilibrium result is conceptually unexciting. And it is not a stable
equilibrium.
14Condition z¯ > zmin stipulates that the di erence in city-specific amenity, i.e. a1≠a2, should
not be infinitesimally small under the perfect skill sorting equilibrium. Because in the case of
a1 ≠ a2 being infinitely close to 0, the equilibrium is essentially the symmetrical city structure
result that I introduced before.
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Figure 1.4: Sorting of heterogeneous entrepreneurs between two cities.
(Note: In this figure, the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 1 is denoted
as U(z, 1), and the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 2 is denoted as
U(z, 2). The skill sorting threshold is denoted as z.)
entrepreneur with initial skill higher than z¯ choose large city, and entrepreneur
with initial skill lower than z¯ choose small city.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the skill allocation between two cities. From proposition 2,
a few results immediately follow. First, the city with innovation advantage (city 1)
has higher average productivity, since all the most productive entrepreneurs gather
in that city. And their productivity improvement from innovation is higher due
to the exogenous innovation advantage. Second, city 1 has higher nominal wage
compare to city 2, because city-specific wage is positively related to city’s average
productivity. Third, the city with innovation advantage e ectively becomes the
larger (or denser) city, because workers want to live in a city with higher wage.
Last, the larger city has higher housing price, because both higher wage and higher
population density tend to escalate housing price. These results are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: (Equilibrium City Characteristics): Assume city 1 is endowed
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with innovation advantage: ‰1 < ‰2. In equilibrium, city 1 has higher population
density, L1
H¯1
> L2
H¯2
, higher average productivity, Q1 > Q2, higher wage, w1 > w2,
and higher housing price, Ph1 > Ph2.
As shown in proposition 3, this spatial sorting model can generate results that
are compatible with city’s cross-sectional stylized facts, such that large cities are
more skilled, and have higher average wages as well as housing prices.
With perfect skill sorting, I can now write down the expressions of average city
productivities:
Q1 = ––≠1
5
–
–≠1 ≠
1
‰1
“(–≠1)
21/26
z¯;
Q2 = ––≠1
5
–
–≠1 ≠
1
‰2
“(–≠1)
21/26
zmin
1≠( zminz¯ )–≠1
1≠( zminz¯ )–
.
(1.4.16)
From equation (4.16), we know the relative productivity is increasing in the skill
sorting threshold z¯:
ˆ
1
Q1
Q2
(z¯)
2
ˆz¯
> 0.
It means that the productivity gap across cities is directly linked with skill sorting
threshold 15. If skill sorting becomes stronger over time, meaning that z¯ ø over
time, the diverging trend in productivity and wage gaps across cities can be at
least partially explained.
1.4.3 Top Income Inequality within Cities
So far I have calculated an entrepreneur’s expected income, see equation (1.4.13).
And we know that workers total income is wjLj, then top income inequality within
a city can be expressed through the ratio between aggregate entrepreneurial income
and labor income:
15Note, the result of ˆ
!
Q1
Q2
(z¯)
"
ˆz¯ > 0 might arise due to the fat tail property of Pareto distribu-
tion. It may not stands if the productivity distribution is symmetrical.
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entrepreneur≠sharej =
´
iœœj  ji (z) dz
wjLj
=
SU “–
(–≠ 1) ≠ 2
A
“‰j
(–≠ 1)
B1/2TV z¯j
Qj
,
where z¯j is the mean initial skill of the mass of entrepreneurs choosing city j,
with z¯j =
´
iœœj zjidi. Taking advantage of expression (1.4.10), the entrepreneurial
income share can be simplified as:
∆ entrepreneur≠sharej = “
–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
‰j
“(–≠1)
21/2
–
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰j
“(–≠1)
21/2 (1.4.17)
This expression suggests that a lower ‰j will raise the entrepreneurial income
share, which relates the innovation activity to income distribution. Formally, this
result is shown as:
Proposition 4: (Top Income Inequality within Cities): The share of entrepreneurial
income within a city increases with innovation e ciency ( 1‰j ). Therefore, assump-
tion ‰1 < ‰2 implies that big city is more unequal compared to small city.
According to this proposition, two results stand out. The first is that large city
is more unequal. This result comes from the complementarity between innovation
and entrepreneurial productivity. Entrepreneurs in the large city benefit more
from innovation activity, because they have higher opportunities to innovate due
to the city’s endowed advantage. Therefore, their income share is higher even
though the wage in large city is also higher.
Observing equation (1.4.17), we can see that the entrepreneurial income share in
each city is completely determined by exogenous parameters: “, – and ‰j. It sug-
gests that top income inequality does not change over time, unless the locational
innovation advantage (‰j) changes16.
16One way to generate increasing top income inequality is letting model adopt a di erent
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1.5 Factors Of Increasing Skill Sorting
So far, the model has successfully delivered the right kind of sorting across cities.
Now I’m going to use the comparative statics of the model to try to analyze what
kind of forces might increase sorting and inequality between cities. There are two
clear candidates presenting themselves in this model: TFP growth and locational
fundamentals.
The aggregate TFP in this model is essentially the mean of overall entrepreneurial
productivities:
TFP =
ˆ z¯
zmin
A
„ú2 + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
zdG (z)+
ˆ Œ
z¯
A
„ú1 + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
zdG (z) = G (z¯)Q1+(1≠G (z¯))Q2.
Since productivity follows a Pareto distribution, an increase in TFP can be proxied
by an increase in the minimum productivity threshold, zmin, of distribution G(·).
With perfect skill sorting, small city’s average productivityQ2 is increasing in zmin.
But large city’s average productivity Q1 is una ected by zmin, except through
equilibrium sorting threshold z¯, see equation (1.4.16). As proved in appendix
A3, the equilibrium sorting threshold z¯ increases if there is an increase in zmin.
It implies that TFP increase will undoubtedly reinforce the skill sorting process,
and increase the productivity gap across cities. This result is summarized as
following:
innovation cost function which generates additional scale e ect. For instance, if the innovation
cost in city j is Ï („ji | z) = ‰jwj1≠„ji zQj , then the equilibrium entrepreneurial income share becomes:
∆ entrepreneur≠sharej = “
–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
‰j
“(–≠1)Lj
21/2
–
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰j
“(–≠1)Lj
21/2 .
The above equation clearly indicates that top income inequality is increasing in city population
size Lj . Therefore, any potential forces that make the large city even large will also make it
more unequal.
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Figure 1.5: Skill Sorting Becomes Stronger if TFP is Higher
(Note: In this figure, the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 1 is denoted
as U(z, 1), and the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 2 is denoted as
U(z, 2). The skill sorting threshold is denoted as z. If zmin ø , the slope of indirect
utility function U(z, 2) rotating to U Õ(z, 2), which resulting threshold increase from z to
z’)
Proposition 5: (Comparative Statics One): The big city disproportionately ben-
efits from an increase in the equilibrium skill sorting threshold z¯. Therefore, the
relative productivity Q1Q2 , relative wage
w1
w2
, and relative population density L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
between two cities are higher if TFP is higher (proxied by zmin ø).
Figure 1.4.2 illustrates the e ect of TFP growth on spatial skill sorting. To
understand the e ect of TFP growth on skill sorting, we need to examine each
city closely. First of all, the rising aggregate TFP indicates that both cities are
becoming more productive. Hence, both cities’ average wages and housing prices
will increase. However, the large city’s average wage and housing price will increase
more, suggesting that it will become more and more di cult for entrepreneurs
being selected there. As a result, some entrepreneurs originally living in big city,
who are marginally more productive than z¯, will be better o  moving to small city.
Hence, the sorting threshold increases due to the endogenous responses of these
marginal entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the fat tail property of Pareto distribution
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indicates that the relative productivity between the large and small cities increases
whenever the sorting threshold increases. In that sense, TFP growth is equivalent
to small city’s technology catching up to the big city, and it strengthens the sorting
process and raises the productivity gap in the end.
As for locational fundamentals, there are three factors that can a ect the equi-
librium sorting result: innovation advantage (1/‰j), land supply (1/÷j) and con-
gestion amenity (aj). First of all, the city endowed with innovation advantage in
equilibrium becomes the large city, and it generates higher innovation opportu-
nity, thus entrepreneurs benefit more from living in that city. Next, a city with
more restricted land supply ( higher ÷j) has higher equilibrium housing price,
which makes the less productive entrepreneurs more deterred. Third, congestion
amenity (aj) represents the downside of living in a over-crowed city, and people
may not want to live in big cities if congestion amenity becomes too high to bear.
The result of comparative statics are shown in proposition 5, and its proof can be
found in appendix A3.
Proposition 6: (Comparative Statics Two): The big city disproportionately ben-
efits from an increase in the equilibrium skill sorting threshold z¯. Therefore, the
relative productivity Q1Q2 , relative wage
w1
w2
, and relative population density L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
be-
tween two cities are: (i) decreasing in big city’s innovation advantage, 1/‰1; (ii)
decreasing in big city’s land supply, 1/÷1. In addition, both relative productivity
Q1
Q2
and relative wage w1w2 are increasing in congestion amenity, a1, but the response
of relative population density L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
to an increase in a1 is uncertain.
Figure 1.4.3 illustrates the comparative statics related to spatial skill sorting.
There are two implications from the above proposition. First, if the innovation ad-
vantage in large city is declining relative to that of the small city, then skill sorting
becomes stronger. This seems to be a paradoxical result, but it can be understood
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Figure 1.6: Skill Sorting Becomes Stronger if innovation Advantage de-
clines
or land supply more restricted or congestion amenity rises
(Note: In this figure, the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 1 is denoted
as U(z, 1), and the indirect utility function deriving from living in city 2 is denoted as
U(z, 2). The skill sorting threshold is denoted as z. If 1‰1 ¿ or 1÷1 ¿, then the slope of
indirect utility function U(z, 1) rotating to U Õ(z, 1), which resulting threshold increase
from z to z’)
from a real world example, such as New York. One hundred years ago, the natural
advantages of New York was more significant than that of Phoenix from economic
point of view. Over time, with technology advancement, certain geographical and
demographic advantages become less important, however, the di erences in pro-
ductivity and human capital composition between these two cities have increased
instead of the other way around. The reason is that even though New York still
has absolute advantage in innovation and production activity, but the relative
advantage of New York is declining. Then the least productive entrepreneurs orig-
inally lived in New York now find themselves better o  moving to cheaper cities.
But, the most productive ones still stay in New York, which renders the average
productivity even higher in New York. The logic behind this is: if the natural
advantage is great enough, then not only the most talented, but also the “lesser”
ones can make it in New York. Once again, the endogenous responses of the
marginal entrepreneurs plus the fat tail property of Pareto distribution lead to a
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larger productivity gap between New York and other smaller cities.
The second implication worth emphasizing is that spatial skill sorting becomes
stronger if big city’s land supply becomes more restricted. This is very intuitive,
because only the richest and the most talented people can a ord high housing price.
Again, we can understand it from a real world example. As the innovation cluster
center in twenty-first century, Silicon valley is currently among the most expensive
city in United States. However, the city’s high housing prices reflect more than
just good weather and high incomes. The city has rather severe restrictions on
home construction. Between 2001 and 2008, despite the booming demand, the
area’s stock of single-family homes increased by less than 5%, which was less than
1/3 of the U.S. average building rate over that period. According to Glaeser
(2011), Silicon valley’s housing price would be 40% lower if there is no restriction
on house/land supply.
1.6 Localized Knowledge Spillover
So far, the baseline model assumes that one city has exogenous innovation ad-
vantage, which attracts the most talented entrepreneurs living there. And these
entrepreneurs in turn push up this city’s wage and housing price, making it too
expensive for the relatively less talented entrepreneurs. As introduced in the ab-
stract, one of the main contributions of this paper is to build a model that allowing
for endogenous innovation advantage. This section is to formalize that extension
through the e ect of localized knowledge spillover. According to Lucas and Moll
(2014), entrepreneurs can interact with and learn from other entrepreneurs in the
same place. On top of their idea, I add the spatial aspect which allowing geog-
raphy to play a role in the process of idea exchange or innovation. Essentially,
innovation is more likely to happen if entrepreneurs live in the same city with
other top talented entrepreneurs, since face-to-face meeting is the more e ective
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form of human interaction. This extension has the following three merits: (i) it
shows that big cities can be endogenously more innovation and more productive
without assuming any exogenous fundamental di erences across di erent cities;
(ii) it also allows me to formally analyze how information technology a ects the
skill compositions at di erent cities; (iii) its modeling approach is very similar to
that of the baseline model, hence it preserves the results of the comparative statics
from the baseline model.
To present the idea at its simplest, the innovation technology is similar to that
of the baseline model, except now innovation depends on an endogenous variable:
local learning opportunities (—j). The innovation process is as following. An en-
trepreneur i in city j can buy a chance of innovation with probability „ji, however
only with chance —j, innovation in city j can actually occur. With probability
(1≠ „ji—j) his productivity remains unchanged, and the ones obtaining a chance
to innovate draws a new skill z+ from distribution G(·). The expected productivity
level conditional on innovation is the same as baseline model:
E
1
z+ | z, innovation
2
=
ˆ Œ
z
xdG(x) = –z
–≠ 1;
the added “plus” superscript refers to the productivity after the innovation deci-
sion. The expected productivity for innovation probability „ji is:
q˜ji (z) = „ji—j
–z
–≠ 1¸ ˚˙ ˝
expected productivity if innovate
+ (1≠ „ji—j) z¸ ˚˙ ˝
innovation not occur
=∆ q˜ji (z) =
1
„ji—j+–≠1
–≠1
2
z.
(1.6.1)
The variable —j stands for local chance of meeting people with higher productivity.
Formally, local learning environment is characterized by a function —j = —(z¯j),
and —(z¯j) = {z¯j œ (0,Œ) : —(z¯j) œ (0, 1)}, where z¯j =
´
iœœj zjidi representing the
average initial productivity of entrepreneurs living in city j. To introduce the
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learning technology in detail, the following assumption is necessary:
Assumption: —(·) is continuous, concave, and increasing in the average initial
productivity of entrepreneurs, z¯j, who endogenously choose city j. Meanwhile it
has following properties: —(0) = 0 and —(Œ) = 1.
The above assumption indicates that as a city becomes more skilled, the chance
of its residents improving productivity is increasing as well. In addition, —(z¯j)
increases faster as z¯j is smaller, eventually it slowly approaches 1 when z¯j ap-
proaches infinity. There are many functions satisfy the above assumption, for
analysis purpose, I choose the following form:
—(z¯j) =
z¯j
z¯j + c
, c > 0; (1.6.2)
The production process in this section is the same as the baseline model, in-
dicating that all the results stated in proposition 1 in baseline model are also
valid here. Therefore, the expected profit from selling variety remains the same:
E˜ (fiji | z) = “wjLjQj q˜ji (z). However, the baseline model assumes di erent inno-
vation costs at di erent locations. The extended model is designed to eliminate
that exogeneity, since it might be mixed with the endogenous e ect of localized
idea exchange. Therefore, I assume there is no fundamental di erences in city’s
innovation costs:
Ï˜ („ji | z) = ‰z1≠ „ji
wjLj
Qj
, ‰ > 0; (1.6.3)
The process of solving for the optimal innovation opportunity is similar to the
baseline model. Its expression is:
„˜ji = 1≠
A
‰ (–≠ 1)
“—j
B1/2
= „˜j (1.6.4)
Clearly, if a city provides a better chance to meet more productive people,
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namely a higher —j, then the equilibrium innovation opportunity „˜j will be higher,
which leads to higher return of innovation investment. Substituting „˜ji in (1.5.1)
with above equation, we can get city’s average productivity:
Qj =
ˆ
œj
A
„˜j—(z¯j) + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
zjidi =
SU–≠ 1 + —(z¯j)
–≠ 1 ≠
A
‰—(z¯j)
“ (–≠ 1)
B1/2TV
¸ ˚˙ ˝
Scale of improvement due to innovation
z¯j.
(1.6.5)
The average productivity in a city Qj depends on two factors: the average pro-
ductivity of entrepreneurs living in that city, z¯j, and the scale of productivity
improvement from innovation. Furthermore, the scale of improvement is comple-
ment to the level of z¯j, indicating that there exists a complementarity between
innovation and entrepreneurial productivity. It is precisely this complementarity
that generates the result of spatial skill sorting.
In this section, I will simplify the process of skill sorting due to the similarity
to baseline model. Therefore, I now jump ahead and introduce the expression of
entrepreneur’s indirect utility function for living in city j:
U˜ ei (j, z) =
≈˜j
P 1≠µhj
z ≠ aj = Œ˜j (Qj) z ≠ aj. (1.6.6)
where Œ˜j (Qj) = “÷j
1
◊
uú+aj
2 µ
1≠µ
5
–≠1+—(z¯j)
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
‰—(z¯j)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2
6
Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
j represents the
real benefit of living in city j, and it is the slope of indirect utility function.
Clearly, as long as condition “µ+µ≠11≠µ Ø 0 holds, there is ˆŒ˜j(Qj)ˆQj > 0. This condition
means that the benefit of living in an increasingly more productive city outweighs
its increasing housing cost, suggesting that more productive entrepreneurs benefit
more from big cities.
With indirect utility function settled, entrepreneurs choose the optimal location
by comparing their utilities of living at di erent cities. Once again, the linear
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relationship between indirect utility function U˜ ei (j, z) and initial skill z indicates
perfect skill sorting. The equilibrium analysis is more complicated compare to
the baseline model, because there exists the possibility of multiple equilibria due
to the fact that entrepreneur’s location choice now depending on other’s choices
as well. The first possible equilibrium is that all entrepreneurs with productivity
higher than certain threshold z¯ú choosing city 1, and the second possible equilib-
rium is that all entrepreneurs with productivity higher than certain threshold z¯ú
choosing city 2. Since city is generic and has no fundamental di erences except
for city-specific amenity, aj, which representing the degree of congestion or crowd-
edness. I can assign one of the city to be the more crowded city, then that city in
equilibrium will become the denser city. To be consistent with baseline model’s
notation, I let the first city be the more crowded one, such that a1 > a2. Based
on this assumption, there exists an unique skill sorting threshold z¯ú, such that
entrepreneurs with initial skill higher than z¯ú choose city 1. The threshold z¯ú is:
z¯ú = a1 ≠ a2
Œ˜1 (Q1)≠ Œ˜2 (Q2)
. (1.6.7)
If this threshold is larger than the minimum level zmin of the initial productivity
distribution G(·), z¯ú > zmin, the spatial equilibrium characterized by perfect skill
sorting is as stated in proposition 7:
Proposition 7: (Localized Knowledge Spillover and Skill Sorting) Assume a1 > a2
and “µ + µ ≠ 1 > 0. With localized knowledge spillover, there exists an unique
equilibrium with perfect skill sorting: entrepreneur with initial skill higher than z¯ú
choose large city, and entrepreneur with initial skill lower than z¯ú choose small
city.
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1.6.1 The E ects of Information Technology
So far, localized knowledge spillover alone still can generate the result that agents
with di erent skills are sorted into cities with di erent productivities. And the
reason for this result is that more talented entrepreneurs benefit more from big
cities due to the learning technology. The next step is to analyze how changes
in information technology a ect the pattern of skill sorting. To implement this
analysis, I let c ¿ representing the improvement in information or communication
technology, because equation (1.6.2) indicates that ˆ—(z¯j)ˆc < 0. Intuitively, modern
technology improves people’s ability to interact or communicate with each other.
It means that people’s chance to exchange ideas becomes stronger as c decreases.
This functional form is mathematically easy, but it is able to incorporate the ef-
fects of information technology on innovation. This line of study is particularly
interesting, because the way people interact with each other have changed dras-
tically in modern society. For example, emails and video chats have infiltrated
almost every aspect of day-to-day life and business operations as well. I want to
explore how these improvements in information technology and telecommunica-
tion change the value of cities, and how they a ect the productivity gap between
cities. The key analysis is to know the e ect on relative productivity, which is
expressed as following:
Q1
Q2
=
–≠1+—(z¯1|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯1|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2
–≠1+—(z¯2|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯2|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2¸ ˚˙ ˝
Direct effect
⇧
z¯ú
zmin
≠
1
zmin
z¯
2–≠1
1≠
1
zmin
z¯
2–≠1
¸ ˚˙ ˝
Sorting effect
(1.6.8)
Information technology improvements generate two di erent e ects on relative
productivity: the “direct e ect” represents the relative improvement of learning
environment in di erent cities, and the “sorting e ect” represents the relative
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change of skill composition due to spatial sorting. As discussed above, the ad-
vancement in information technology (c ¿) improves city’s learning environment,
meaning ˆ—jˆc < 0. On the other hand, depending on the skill composition of each
city’s, z¯j, a decline in c will increase — (z¯j) to di erent degrees, and this di erential
e ect is determined by the sign of ˆ2—(z¯j)ˆQjˆc . Depending on whether information tech-
nology is complement or substitute with city, I summarize the e ects in two cases.
According to Gaspar and Glaeser (1996), when telecommunications technology
improves, there are two opposing e ects on cities and face-to-face interactions:
some relationships that used to be face-to-face will be done electronically (an
intuitive substitution e ect), and some individuals will choose to make more con-
tacts, many of which result in face-to-face interactions. In the case of them being
complement, Silicon Valley is a good example. People in Silicon Valley usually
only require two things to work, phone and computer, so they can easily connect
electronically. They could have worked from anywhere, yet they choose to live in
the most expensive city in U.S.. It implies that human interactions are essential,
and cannot be replaced by telecommunications.
(i) The condition for information technology and city being complement is: 0 <
Q2 < Q1 < c17. Whenever information technology and city are complement to
each other, information technology advancement will improve big city’s learning
opportunity to a greater degree. In this case, whenever there is a drop in c, the
increase in the real benefit of living in big city will be greater than the increase
in small city, such that —Œ˜1 (Q1) > —Œ˜2 (Q2). According to equation (1.5.8),
the equilibrium sorting threshold z¯ú will decrease in this scenario. Intuitively, if
there is a greater improvement in big city’s learning opportunity as a result of
information technology advancement, then the less productive entrepreneurs will
17The technical condition for information technology and city being complement is as follow-
ing: whenever 0 < Q2 < Q1 < c, then ˆ
2—(z¯j)
ˆQjˆc
< 0, which implies that a decline in cwill lead to
a greater increase in —1 than —2, such that ——(z¯1 | Òc) > ——(z¯2 | Òc).
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be tempted to move into big city for its greater benefits despite the high housing
price, hence z¯ú ¿. These two di erent forces will lead to two competing e ects on
city’s relative productivity:
Q1
Q2
=
–≠1+—(z¯1|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯1|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2
–≠1+—(z¯2|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯2|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2¸ ˚˙ ˝
Direct effect
ø ⇧
z¯ú
zmin
≠
1
zmin
z¯ú
2–≠1
1≠
1
zmin
z¯ú
2–≠1 ¿
¸ ˚˙ ˝
Sorting effect
;
The increasing e ect of Òc on the “direct e ect” captures the relatively greater
change in big city’s learning environment; the decreasing e ect of z¯ú ¿ on the
“sorting e ect” captures the negative e ect on skill sorting. If the negative sorting
e ect in part B is the dominant force, then the equilibrium relative productivity
decreases as information technology improves. On the other hand, if the positive
e ect in part A is the dominant force, then the equilibrium relative productivity
increases as information technology improves.
(ii) The condition for information technology and city being substitute is: 0 <
Q2 < c < Q1 or 0 < c < Q2 < Q118. Whenever information technology and city are
substitute to each other, information technology advancement will improve small
city’s learning opportunity to a greater degree. In this case, the increase in the
benefit of living in a big city will be smaller than the increase in small city, then the
value of small city inherently rises. Therefore, small cities become more attractive
since the barrier of knowledge spread now declines. According to equation (1.5.8),
the equilibrium sorting threshold z¯ú will increase accordingly. Intuitively, if the
improvement of learning environment in big city is smaller compare to small city,
then the marginally less productive entrepreneurs, who originally live in big city,
will move to small city instead, hence z¯ú ø. As a consequences of these two di erent
forces, there will be two competing e ects on city’s relative productivity:
18The technical condition for information technology and city being substitute is as following:
whenever 0 < Q2 < c < Q1 or 0 < c < Q2 < Q1, then ˆ
2—(z¯j)
ˆQjˆc
> 0, which implies that a decline
in cwill lead to a greater increase in —2 , such that ——(z¯1 | Òc) < ——(z¯2 | Òc).
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Q1
Q2
=
–≠1+—(z¯1|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯1|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2
–≠1+—(z¯2|c)
(–≠1) ≠
1
‰—(z¯2|c)
“(–≠1)
2 1
2
¿
¸ ˚˙ ˝
part A
⇧
z¯ú
zmin
≠
1
zmin
z¯ú
2–≠1
1≠
1
zmin
z¯ú
2–≠1
¸ ˚˙ ˝
part B
ø;
The decreasing e ect of Òc on the “direct e ect” captures the relatively smaller
change in big city’s learning environment; the increasing e ect of z¯ú ¿ on the
“sorting e ect” captures the positive e ect on the relative skill composition at two
cities. Like the first case, there is no way to determine which part is the dominant
e ect.
Now it is time to summarize the above e ects. When telecommunication and
city are complementary, the benefits of big cities increased more than that of
small cities, because information technology has made it more and more valuable
for people to stay close to the top talents, thus big cities will attract more and more
relatively unskilled people. The opposite tradeo  occurs when telecommunication
and city are substitute. In that case, the benefits of small cities increased relatively
more, because information technology has rendered it easier for people to learn
from top talents over long distance, thus small cities will attract more and more
relatively unskilled people.
Essentially, the e ect of localized knowledge exchange provides another per-
spective as to why large cities have better environment for idea exchange, without
assuming exogenous di erences on locational fundamentals. Therefore, when in-
novation advantage in large city is shut down, meaning that ‰1 = ‰2, localized
knowledge spillover alone still can produce perfect skill sorting result. The reason-
ing behind this is that large cities are not only the places with dense population,
they are also the places where the best and brightest minds live. Knowledge spread
is simply faster or more e ective when people live close to the ones that with the
best ideas. Just as Marshall (1890) described how in dense concentrations “the
mysteries of the trade become no mystery but are, as it were, in the air.” To simply
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put, hanging around successful people will improve the chance of people becoming
successful themselves. Everyone would want to live in the city with best learning
opportunities. But the most talented entrepreneurs are those most able to take
advantage of these opportunities and so most willing to pay for them.
1.7 Model Extension: Trade
Economic activity depends crucially on the transportation of goods and people
across space. So far the model focuses on the interaction of cities through the
mobility of people. This section explores how the input-output linkages a ect
spatial concentration through including bilateral trade into the baseline model.
Furthermore, trade and transportation cost have declined greatly over time. It
would be interesting to analyze how the decrease in trade cost shapes economic
activity across space.
Bilateral trade occurs both at the di erentiated intermediate goods and final
consumption goods level. Trade cost is assumed to be the typical iceberg form,
meaning ·nj Ø 1 units of must be shipped from city n in order for one unit
to arrive in region j. It is necessary to assume asymmetrical trade cost for the
purpose of forming asymmetric cities. The asymmetric trade cost might arise
from a number of considerations, such as land gradient and trade volume (per-
unit iceberg trade cost is lower when trade volume is larger). In addition, big
cities, due to scale economy, might provide better or less-costly services related
to trade such as insurance, which then leads to lower ice-berg cost. There are
other plausible channels that capable of generating trade asymmetry. However, it
is theoretically inconsistent to analyze such channels under the framework of this
paper. For instance, Waugh (2010) believed that the asymmetric trade volume is
highly correlated with income level, rather than geographic distance. And it is
well known that the consumption baskets of high and low-income consumers look
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very di erent (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal
(2016) suggested that the asymmetry in trade hinges on the fact that poor con-
sumers spend relatively more on tradable sectors, while high-income individuals
consume relatively more services, which are the least traded sector. Therefore,
trade balance condition will hold because there exists a lower rate of substitution
between imports and domestic goods for the relatively poor. As we can see, the
above methods for modeling asymmetric trade system focus on demand side, and
it requires two sectors: tradable and non-tradable. But it is conceptually di cult
to adopt such extra structure under this framework. Whereas asymmetric trade
cost assumption is a relatively easy approach in this paper.
The production process is the same as the baseline model. In each city there
is a final good producer that supplies the final output good competitively. And
final good serves as numeraire in both cities. Entrepreneurs produce di erentiated
intermediate goods and have claims on the net profit. The only di erence between
baseline model and the extended model is that the production of final good in a city
requires intermediate goods input from both cities instead of just local varieties.
The final good output in city j is defined as following:
Yj =
Qa ÿ
nœ{1,2}
ˆ
iœœ
y◊njidi
Rb1/◊ , ◊ œ (0, 1) (1.7.1)
where ynji is the amount of intermediate good i (i indexing for entrepreneur)
used for final good production in city j shipped from city n. Profit maximization
implies that intermediate good price is a constant markup over the marginal cost
of supplying a variety,
pnji =
1
◊
·njwn
q“nji
. (1.7.2)
Due to the love of variety, all entrepreneurs sell their di erentiated intermediate
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goods to both cities. The final output good is numeraire in each city, then the
demand of intermediate good i from city n to city j is
ynji =
A
·njwn
◊q“nji
B 1
◊≠1
Yj. (1.7.3)
Factor market clearing implies that local aggregate output Yj is the sum of imports
from all locations. Replacing (1.5.3) into final good production function (1.5.1),
the factor market clearance condition is:
SUA ◊
wj
B 1
“
QjYj +
A
◊
·njwn
B 1
“
QnYj
TV = Yj. (1.7.4)
With intermediate goods price function (1.6.2) and demand function (1.6.3), the
value of locationj’s imports from location n can be expressed as:
X (n, j) =
ˆ
pnjiynjidi =
A
◊
·njwn
B 1
“
QnYj. (1.7.5)
Where Qj still represents the average productivity of entrepreneurs living in city
j, and its definition is Qj =
´
œj
1
„ji+–≠1
–≠1
2
zjidi. Trade volume expressed in (1.6.5)
states that the volume of city j’s imports from city n depends on a bilateral trade
friction ·nj, an origin-specific cost (inverse) term
1
◊
wn
2 1
“ Qn, and target market’s
size Yj. Goods market clearing and balanced trade imply that for city n, j œ {1, 2},
n ”= j :
X (n, j) = X (j, n) .
Replace X (n, j) with (1.6.5) into the trade balance condition, we can get the
following result:
A
◊
·12w1
B 1
“
Q1Y2 =
A
◊
·21w2
B 1
“
Q2Y1. (1.7.6)
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The spatial equilibrium is the same as baseline mode, with an additional condition
for balanced trade. Next I show how the process of innovation and spatial sorting
changes.
1.7.1 Innovation and Skill Sorting
Entrepreneurs face the same choices in the extended trade model. First they
decide where to stay. Then they decide the optimal investment on innovation
based on initial skill as well as the location choice. After which, production takes
place. There is no decision needed on whether or not to export, since each and
every one of the entrepreneurs will export. Using equations (1.6.2) and (1.6.3),
the aggregate profit for entrepreneur i located at city j before innovation cost is
E
1
fiXji | z
2
= (1≠◊)
A
◊
wj
B1/“ SUYj +
A
1
·jn
B1/“
Yn
TVA„ji + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
z. (1.7.7)
The expected profit in (1.6.7) indicates that if the cost of shipping goods from
two cities are di erent, or in this case large city is cost e cient ·12 < ·21, then
choosing which city to stay has direct e ect on the profit from trade. Using the
trade balance condition (1.6.6) and factor market clearance condition (1.6.4), the
expected profit function can be simplified as
E
1
fiXji | z
2
= (1≠◊) Yj
Qj
A
„ji + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
z. (1.7.8)
Comparing the expected profit function (1.4.5) from the baseline model with ex-
pression (1.6.8), we will notice that they are of the exact same form. This ob-
servation indicates the equilibrium innovation opportunity for each entrepreneur
under the two models are exactly the same. Peculiar as this result may seem, it
makes sense mathematically. Because both the expected profit function and the
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innovation cost function are linear to city’s economy size Yj and entrepreneur’s
expected productivity qji. This linearity relationship along with the trade balance
condition indicate the equilibrium innovation opportunity „Xji is
„Xji = 1≠
A
‰j (–≠ 1)
“
B1/2
= „Xj (1.7.9)
With the expression of expected profit in (1.6.8) and the optimal innovation op-
portunity in (6.9), the expected net profit is
 Xji (z) = ≈Xj z. (1.7.10)
where ≈Xj =
5
“–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
“‰j
(–≠1)
21/26 wjLj
Qj
summarizes entrepreneur’s return of pro-
ductivity for living in city j, which includes the gain from both innovation and
trade. With expected net profit , the skill sorting process is determined by the
following utility maximization problem:
max
jœ{1,2}
U (z, j) = ŒXj z ≠ aj. (1.7.11)
where ŒXj =
1
1
÷j
21≠µ 5 “–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
“‰j
(–≠1)
21/26 (wjLj)µ
Qj
represents the real benefit of
entrepreneur living in city j. The process of skill sorting among entrepreneurs is
the same before, which means there exists an unique equilibrium skill threshold
z¯X , such that entrepreneurs with initial skills higher than z¯X choosing to live in
the big city, and entrepreneurs with initial skills lower than z¯X choosing to live in
small city. The threshold z¯X is defined by the following equation:
z¯X = a1 ≠ a2
ŒX1 ≠ ŒX2
. (1.7.12)
As proved in appendix A5, when trade cost is asymmetrical, with the large city
facing lower trade cost, skill sorting will become stronger as trade costs decline.
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For example, if both city’s ice-berg trade costs decline by the same percentage,
say 50%, then the sorting threshold increases accordingly. Proposition 8 captures
this result.
Proposition 8: (Trade Cost Decline and Skill Sorting) With asymmetrical trade
costs, ·21 > ·12, there exists an unique equilibrium with perfect skill sorting: en-
trepreneur with initial skill higher than z¯X choose large city, and entrepreneur with
initial skill lower than z¯ú choose small city. In addition, the relative productivity
Q1
Q2
and relative wage w1w2 across cities become higher as trade costs decline by the
same proportion.
In a economy with asymmetric trade costs, entrepreneurs in large city benefit
more from a trade cost decline, because they end up spending less on shipping
goods to the other city, see equation (1.6.2). In equilibrium, the benefits of lower
trade cost in large city leads to stronger competition among entrepreneurs. As a
result, the relative wage between large and small city w1w2 increases as trade costs
decrease, see detailed proof in appendix A5. In equilibrium, spatial skill sorting
becomes stronger in response to trade cost decline, and the productivity as well
as wage gaps across cities become wider.
1.8 Conclusions
This paper builds a model to integrate innovation, skill sorting and agglomera-
tion in a multi-city framework. In the model, innovation and knowledge spillover
are the main forces of agglomeration. The fundamental di erence between cities
is that some city has better environment in stimulating innovation, which is re-
flected as di erences in learning opportunities. Everyone would like to be where
learning opportunities are the greatest, so that they can improve productivity.
But only the most talented entrepreneurs rise above the competition, because
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they are the ones who can a ord the higher wages and higher housing prices. In
large cities, entrepreneurs invest more resources to reap the benefits of innova-
tion, hence innovation activities heavily concentrate in these cities. Meanwhile,
the complementarity between skill sorting and innovation causes the large cities
having higher productivity comparing to small cities. The productivity premium
in large city then leads to higher wages. In equilibrium, the higher nominal wages
compensate the higher living costs in big cities.
This paper focus on the interaction between innovation concentration, skill con-
centration, and their e ects on spacial inequality. Cities play an active role in this
framework. A few city-specific factors serve as channels for spatial skill sorting,
such as innovation advantage, housing supply, and congestion amenity. Through
comparative static analysis, we can get some insights on what are the driving
forces behind the increased skill sorting over the past three decades. In addition,
the paper provides a theory on how TFP growth and trade cost decline a ect the
distribution of human capital across cities. Over all, this framework prove to be
tractable enough to explore what is causing the great divergence among American
cities.
Furthermore, the extended model in section 1.3 discussed the e ects of localized
knowledge spillover. Spatial knowledge spillover has long been perceived as one of
the most important causes for urban agglomeration. Many theories have proved
that sharing knowledge or skill through social interaction can generate significant
spillover e ect, which is considered as the key to economic growth. The emphasis
of this paper is to provide a simple theory of how localized knowledge spillover
a ects the geographical divergence across cities. In larger cities, the environment
of idea exchange of knowledge spread is better, because they are the places where
the most talented individuals live. And every one wants to hang out with the smart
or successful people, since it gives them the best chances to improve productivities
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and enhance innovations. Thus the most skilled and most expensive cities attract
more talented individuals, and become more skill-intensive. This will ultimately
lead the American cities on a diverging trend. And the fact has proved this point.
Cities like New York, San Francisco and Seattle are not bogged down by high
living costs, they are in fact on the rise compared to the rest of cities.
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Chapter 2
Household Savings Behavior And Coresidence In Urban
China
2.1 Introduction
Since the implementation of housing privatization reform in 1998, there has
been significant housing price appreciation in China. The average house value-to-
income ratio in mega-cities such as Beijing and Shanghai has been over 10 since
2010, and it is is about 6 or higher in second and third tier cities. As banks in China
impose 30% minimum down payment, the house price-to-income ratio indicates
it would take about two years of household income to make a down payment.
Suppose household took a mortgage loan for the other 70% of the house price,
with 6% mortgage interest rate and 20 years maximum maturity, it would take
40% of annual household income to service the mortgage loan. Therefore, it is too
heavy a burden for the average household to buy a house. The natural question
to ask is how are Chinese people a ording the outrageous housing price? This
paper examines the relationship between the rising house prices and household
saving rate, and how households solve the housing a ordability issues through
intergenerational transfer and coresidence.
The Chinese household savings rate has risen from 18% in 1998 to 32% in 2012.
This persistent increase in savings rate is extraordinary even among the fast-
growing economies. Aside from the rising household savings rate across all board,
the savings rate of the young households is particularly high, even higher than
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the middle-aged, see figure 2.1. This age-savings profile is di cult to understand
within a standard life cycle model. In a conventional life cycle model, when in-
come growth trend is high, the young should save less than the middle-aged in
anticipation of future income prospects. One way to reconcile this inconsistency
is incorporating housing choices into the life cycle model. There are two living
arrangements most common in urban China, coresidence and buying a home, both
having implications on age-savings pattern1. When the credit market is under-
developed, with the strong motivation for buying homes, young adults are forced
to reduce consumption in facilitating savings during the early periods. On the
other hand, shared housing between adult children and parents implies the aggre-
gation of savings within households, hence household savings will be a ected by
coresidence choice.
Figure 2.1: Life-cycle profile on savings rate in 2012
Note: the age-savings profile of 2012 is calculated from China Household Finance Survey
(CHFS).
1Due to the nascent nature of housing rental market, only 15% households rent, among
which, two thirds are public rental housing. Hence renting is not considered in this paper.
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In a fast growing economy, intergenerational coresidence would be expected to
decline with socio-economic development, because extended family ties will be
weakened by the increasing labor opportunities and growing income prospects.
But the evidence of intergenerational coresidence from China Household Finance
Survey in 2012 showed otherwise. Coresidence in urban China is quite common, in
fact, about 45% young adults aged 35 still live with at least one of their parents, see
figure 2.2. The coresidence pattern in China reflects that the younger generation is
very much dependent on the housing support of the older generation. Due to the
housing privatization reform in the 1990s, 90% of urban households bought their
own houses at cheap prices, thus housing is not an issue for the older generation.
The younger generation, however, has to face severe financial burden caused by
the high housing prices. Therefore, coresidence is an important mechanism for
young adults to lower consumption and generate higher savings. In addition,
the age-savings profiles can be separately examined based on di erent household
structures: coresidence and non-coresidence.
Aside from coresidence, intergenerational transfer is another important mecha-
nism for young adults to a ord expensive housing. According to the China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) survey, 13% parents buy a house
for their children as wedding gifts. And more than 70% of parents give money
transfer to their children during the wedding event, where the average value is
about 3 times of the annual household income. To realize this level of intergen-
erational transfer, parents need to have substantial savings. It suggests that the
financial burden of housing purchase not only a ects young household’s saving and
living situation, it also bears significance on older household’s saving decisions.
To fix ideas, I built a life-cycle dynastic model with endogenous housing deci-
sion and intergenerational transfer. The model incorporates two generations: old
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of life-cycle coresidence patterns in urban China
and U.S.
Note: people who are at school are not included when calculating the age-coresidence pattern.
parents who live from 45 to 80 years old, and adult children from 20 to 80. In line
with the extremely high homeownership caused by housing privatization reform in
the 1990s, the older generation are home owners to begin with, and adult children
make the optimal living choice at each period: owning a house or living with par-
ents. Coresidence promises adult children free housing but bears disutility; once
adult children buy their own houses, home resale is not allowed in this paper.
Parent and adult children make the optimal consumption and saving decisions in-
dependently, and intergenerational transfer is realized through lump-sum fashion
at each period. To quantify the e ects of housing price and financial constraint
on household life-cycle behavior, I calibrate the model using China Household
Finance Survey data from 2011 and China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS) survey from 2013. With the calibrated parameters, I then con-
duct three policy experiments to isolate the e ects of decreasing housing prices and
down-payment ratio on savings rate and household living arrangement patterns.
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There are three main results in this paper. The first is that when down payment
ratio drops from 30% to 20%, household behavior patterns on savings and cores-
idence change very little. With the house price staying the same, lowering down
payment alone does not fundamentally change housing a ordability level, hence
the optimal timing for young adult to move out would not change very much. It is
for the same reason, the life cycle savings profile for coresidence households stays
roughly the same. The down payment does have greater e ects on the savings
profile of non-coresidence households during early periods, which is mainly caused
by the fact that less initial investment is made due to the dropped down payment
requirement. This result implicates that down payment has very limited e ects
on household savings rate and coresidence pattern when house price is very high.
Therefore, the policies designed to derease down payment requirement will not
solve the housing a ordability problems in China.
The second result is regarding the impact of housing price on households age-
savings pattern. When house price decreases by half, the savings rate of coresi-
dence households decreases by roughly 27%, and the savings rate of non-coresidence
household decreases by about 32%. Aside from the significant e ects of house price
on aggregate savings rate, housing has deeper impact on younger households in
terms of savings behavior. There are three reasons responsible for the decline in
household savings rate. The first is that cheaper housing requires less transfer
from parents to adult children, thus parents are less obligated to save for in-
tergenerational transfer. Secondly, adult children feel less compelled to reduce
consumption in facilitating savings due to the mitigated credit constraint, permit-
ting lower saving rate. Third, lowering housing price lead to less housing asset,
thus the savings rate of non-coresidence households would drop over life cycle. On
further examination, when house price and down payment decrease at the same
time, the savings rate over life cycle drops even more. This result implies that
people are strongly motivated to save for housing, hence the analysis of savings
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cannot ignore housing choice. Meanwhile, in a life cycle model with endogenous
housing choice, intergenerational transfer and coresidence are important elements
that connect two generations.
The last result is that when housing price decreases by half and down payment
drops from 30% to 20%, coresidence rate over life cycle would decline, but still
remains higher than the U.S. level. I choose this policy experiment because it
makes the housing market condition similar to that of the U.S., meaning house-
holds facing a house value-to-income ratio of 3 and 20% minimum down-payment2.
The less-than-expected e ect on coresidence probably has two reasons. First, this
model does not include repeated home sales, hence people are tempted to buy
houses later so that they can enjoy bigger or better houses. Second, since rental
housing is not built in the model as an endogenous housing choice, young adults
would have no choice but to share parent’s house until they can a ord homes. If
the model is expanded to include both repeated home sales and rental housing,
the coresidence pattern might be explained more.
In summary, the above results support the main hypothesis in this paper. Hous-
ing indeed is one of the most important motives for household saving, and it has
more impact on young household’s savings behavior than the middle-aged. Mean-
while, comparing to the insanely high house price, down payment has less influence
on household’s saving and living arrangement choices, which is consistent with lit-
erature. Lastly, the high coresidence rates in China are not solely determined by
the housing shortage situation.
2A typical measure for housing a ordability is house price-to-income ratio, which is
dividing the median home price by median household income. And the mortgage mar-
ket usually assumes a 30-year fixed rate mortgage with a 20 percent down payment, see
http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/report/20160531_how_to_worry_about_house_prices.html.
55
Institutional Background and Literature
Before 1998, housing was allocated to the employees as an in-kind welfare of
the public sectors and SOEs. After 1998, the employer-based public welfare hous-
ing system was terminated, and the occupied houses were sold to workers with
heavily-discounted prices, as a result, more than 80% of the households own their
houses. The privatization reform of housing market has led to a decade-long hous-
ing market boom and enormous housing price appreciation. According to Fang,
Gu, Xiong, and Zhou (2016), housing prices in first tier cities like Beijing and
Shanghai have risen by five folds from 2003 to 2013, and roughy three folds in sec-
ond and third tier cities. On top of housing price appreciation, the down payment
for housing mortgage loans is usually as high as, or even higher than 40%. The
price-to-income ratio is normally used to measure the housing a ordability level.
With the combination of high housing price and high down payment, the price-to-
income ratio is about 6 or higher for the middle income households, which indicates
very severe housing a ordability problems in China, suggesting that people need
to save a lot to buy houses.
This paper is related to two branches of literature: the literature about the
Chinese households saving behavior (e.g., Wei and Zhang (2011); Chamon and
Prasad (2010); Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013)) , and the literature on
coresidence (Rosenzweig and Zhang (2014); Kaplan (2012)). Chamon and Prasad
(2010) documented household saving behavior relative to age, time and cohorts.
They found that the increased expenditure on education, health and housing has
statistically significant e ects on the rising savings rate. In addition, they sug-
gested that credit constraint should be important in explaining the high saving
rate of the young, but they did not discuss thoroughly the link between credit con-
straint caused by housing and household saving behavior. Wei and Zhang (2011)
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argued that gender imbalance caused male individuals to save more so that they
can improve their social status on marriage market. They believed this competi-
tive saving motive has pushed the housing price in China to appreciate. However,
the hypothesis of this paper is that housing is an important motive for household
saving, and the main focus is to analyze the e ects of housing price appreciation
on household life cycle savings profile. Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013)
analyzed the impact of “one child policy” on household saving behavior. They
believed that policy restriction on fertility caused education investment on child
to increase due to the quantity substituting for quality e ect, and the middle-
aged households save more in anticipation of the reduced transfers from their only
child. As a result, they estimated a “hump shaped” age saving pattern, which is
drastically di erent from the predicted age-savings pattern in this paper. Another
popular idea for the rising savings rate is changes in demographic, according to
Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015), the rising share of working population for the
last decade can explain about half of the increase in savings rate. As for the rel-
ative literature on coresidence, the paper by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2014) is the
only one I am aware of that studies the e ect of intergenerational coresidence on
China’s particular age saving profile. They developed a multi-generation life-cycle
model including both coresidence and saving, and tested the e ects of coresidence
on young’s saving empirically. The di erence between their paper and this paper
is that they did not take into consideration of the e ects of credit constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 first gives some brief
empirical analysis on the relationship between coresidence and saving behavior,
and then introduces detailed facts on urban China’s households’ savings behavior,
coresidence, housing a ordability problem, and intergenerational transfer using
CHFS and CHARLS datasets. Section 2.3 introduces the life-cycle dynasty model
of endogenous housing choices, and some analytic implications of credit constraint
on housing and savings decisions. Section 2.4 calibrates the model with CHFS and
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CHARLS data. Section 2.5 conducts three policy experiments using the calibrated
parameters. Section 2.6 presents an alternative approach for model calibration.
Section 2.7 provides conclusion of this paper.
2.2 Data Introduction And Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to introduce the main information about household
savings, intergenerational transfer, coresidence and housing a ordability problem
in China. The China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data from 2012 is a
national representative sample that contains 8,438 households ( Urban=5,194;
Rural=3,244 ) and 29,500 individual observations, with detailed information on
household asset, debt, income and expenditure,and demographics. Because CHFS
lacks adequate information on intergenerational transfer, especially the type of
transfer for aiding children’s housing purchase, I use CHARLS (China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study) to account for the extent of intergenerational
transfer in urban China. From here on out, I only report the statistics on urban
sample in CHFS and CHARLS. I do not include rural sample in my study, be-
cause things are quite di erent in rural area. Chinese rural households generally
have more than one child, indicating that fertility choice is endogenous, which
will complicate the model regarding intergenerational transfer and coresidence.
Because parents need to decide how many children to have, and whether or not
to live with their adult children, as well as which child to live with. Therefore the
circumstances of adult children core siding with their parents in rural area is quite
di erent from that of urban area.
One of the major pattern I could obtain from CHFS is age-savings profile. The
data contains household level aggregate income and consumption expenditure, so I
can get the saving rate (defined as 1≠ consumption expendituredisposable income ) at household level 3. In
3Consumption expenditure includes household expenditure on food, clothing, housing ex-
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the case of coresidence, the aggregate multigenerational savings rate is available,
but individual level savings rate is not included in the data. Besides saving,
detailed information on age, coresidence and employment status for each family
member is also available, so I could keep track of the age-coresidence pattern for
each household4. Figure 1 shows the age-savings pattern using CHFS from 2012,
by which we can see that the savings rate of the young (before age 40) are roughly
the same or slightly higher than the middle-aged people (40 - 50).
The life cycle coresidence rate obtained from CHFS data is defined as the mean
of probability that adult children living with their parents, where “parents” in-
cludes parents, parents-in-law, and grand-parents5. In addition, the calculation
excluded the respondents who are students. We can observe a striking pattern of
the age-coresidence profile from figure 2.2 : older people are more likely to live
apart from their parents. Besides age, there are other factors a ecting coresidence,
such as income (richer people are less subject to credit constraint posed by hous-
ing) and geographic location (housing prices vary a lot across di erent regions ),
hence it is necessary to examine further the relationship between coresidence and
age when household income and geographic region are taken into consideration.
The coresidence rate is considered as a function of household’s log-income and
individual’s age group dummies, as well as individual’s economic region dummies.
I regress the coresidence rates by the following regression for each individual who
aged between 20 to 45 in urban China:
pense (housing renovation or maintenance ), family equipment (including consumer durables)
and daily necessities, home services (e.g., cleaning, cooking and child-sitting), medical expenses,
communication, travel expense, recreation, education and childcare.
4The labor income of family members usually just report household head or spouse’s labor
income, so I could not identity children and parent’s labor income at the same time for most of
the households.
5This definition is corresponding to the obtained pattern in figure 2.
59
Table 2.1: OLS regression for coresidence
Dependent variable : Indicator for coresidence
Age group 1 (20≥23) 0.58***
(0.039)
Age group 2 (24≥26) 0.49***
(0.039)
Age group 3 (27≥29) 0.50***
(0.04)
Age group 4 (30≥32) 0.39***
(0.039)
Age group 5 (33≥35) 0.26***
(0.043)
Age group 6 (36≥38) 0.21***
(0.041)
Age group 7 (39≥42) 0.09**
(0.039)
Log household income -0.02***
(0.008)
House_value (Current) 0.02***
(0.006)
Intercept 0.27
(0.102)
City Fixed E ect Y
R2 0.1663
Observations 2857
Ci = —0 +
8ÿ
s=1
—s · as +
5ÿ
r=1
–r · dr + “ log(incomei) + ‘i;
where Ci is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if living with parents,
as is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the individual belongs to age
group s. There are 8 age groups: age 21-23, age 24 - 26, age 27 - 29, age 30 - 32,
age 33 - 35, age 36 - 38, age 39 - 42, age 43 - 45. dr is an indicator variable that
takes a value of 1 if the individual lives at region r, and the 5 economic regions are:
mega-city (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen); east coast; central China;
northeast China; and western China. The reason to include economic region in the
regression is that there is a wide variation in housing prices across di erent regions,
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since high housing prices is one of the causes for people choosing coresidence,
disregarding economic regions might lead to biased estimation. From table 2.1,
we can see that the probability of one living with one’s parents is decreasing in age,
and people tend to live apart in richer households. In addition, table 2.1 suggests
that young adults tend to move out earlier in richer households; but they tend to
stay longer if the house has greater value. Based on the regression results in table
2.1, I can obtain the predicted age-coresidence pattern when controlling for other
factors, which is shown in figure 2.3. According to figure 2.3, we can see that the
life-cycle coresidence pattern still remains after controlling for household’s income
and economic region.
Figure 2.3: Life-cycle pattern of coresidence
Figure 2.4 shows the age-savings profiles under di erent household structures:
coresidence and non-coresidence. We can see that the savings rate of the young un-
der coresidence is higher than that of non-coresidence households, and the savings
rate has a down-ward trend as people get older. Because there are other con-
founding factors a ecting household saving, such as household income, housing
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Table 2.2: Impact of Coresidence on Household Saving Rate
Dependent variable: household Saving Rate
Coresidence 0.23**
(0.11)
Coresidence ◊age -0.005*
(0.003)
Age 0.009***
(0.002)
head_education -0.87***
(0.009)
Log household income 0.76***
(0.018)
Log house value (Current) -0.13***
(0.01)
Observations 3353
Adjusted R2 0.3657
asset and age, it is necessary to examine whether the above described pattern still
exists with empirical analysis. With the data on household savings rate and cores-
idence, I regress savings rate on coresidence indicator variable with the following
equation :
savingi = —0 + —1coresidencei + —2coresidencei ú agei + —3 log(incomei)
+—4agei + —5educationi + —6housei + ‘i
Here coresidencei is an indicator variable, with coresidencei = 1 stands for
adults children and parents living together, and coresidencei = 0 stands for living
apart. In addition, housei represents log house-value, and educationi stands for
household head’s education level. Table 2.2 shows that the coe cient of coresi-
dence is positive, and the coe cient on the interaction between coresidence and
age is negative, which means coresidence and household savings rate are positively
correlated when adult children are young. And as young adults age, this positive
correlation weakens.
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Figure 2.4: Age-savings profile under coresidence and non-coresidence
China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) is a biennial sur-
vey that is nationally representative of residents age 45 and older. There are two
national baseline survey: 2011 and 2013, only 2013 survey contains relevant data
on intergenerational transfer from parents to adult in supporting children’s hous-
ing purchase. In China, the financial support adult children get from their parents
when they buy houses is substantial and quite common. However, the survey has
no exact information on the level of transfer just for housing support, such that
households were not asked whether they bought their own housing, or accepting
the housing as gifts from their parents, or how much financial help they received
from their parents. Hence I use wedding gifts as an indicator for intergenerational
transfer in this paper. In the event of wedding, Chinese parents usually give their
children a large amount of money transfer as betrothal gifts. Some parents even
buy a house for their children. This common practice of wedding transfer gives
indication as to why the young would want to save or buy a house. One important
reason is marital competition, as suggested by Wei and Zhang (2011). Because
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Table 2.3: Intergenerational Transfer Measured by Wedding gift
Family Income Share of family Ratio of gift value Share of family buy
(Quantile) gave gift to children to parent’s income house for children
1(Low) 72% 3.7 10%
2 70% 2.4 11%
3 75% 1.5 15%
4(High) 77% 1.9 17%
Note: table 3 is derived using CHARLS in 2013 , and only including urban households whose
children’s wedding occurred after year 1998.
owning a house will significantly improve one’s status on marriage market, thus
savings rate is elevated in households with young adults. The 2013 CHARLS data
asked specific questions on intergenerational transfer for wedding, such as “Did
you give betrothal gifts when your child got married”, “How much was the total
value of those betrothal gifts”, “Did you buy a house for him/her when your child
got married” and “How much was the total value of the house”. Table 2.3 pre-
sented the extent of intergenerational transfer using wedding gifts measurement
6. We can see from table 2.3 that the intergenerational transfer from parents to
children is remarkably high.
2.3 Model
To examine the relationship between housing prices and savings in a regime
with intergenerational transfer and coresidence, I construct a simple life-cycle
dynastic model. Parents and adult children separately determine their optimal
consumption paths and whether to share the parents’ houses. Parents have houses
to begin with, so they can provide housing support to adult children in the form
of coresidence. Meanwhile, they can make intergenerational transfer in aid of
children’s housing purchase. The option of coresidence allows adult children to
6Some households have more than one child, in that case I use the maximum of wedding
gifts that parents gave all the children given that the wedding occurred after 1998.
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save living costs through shared housing, and delay the timing of housing purchase.
Eventually adult children will have enough savings, at least enough to pay for the
down payment, then they will move out of parent’s house. There are two living
arrangements for adult children: either living with their parents (coresidence)
or buying their own houses. This set-up categorizes households in two groups,
coresidence and non-coresidence, which allows me to explore the e ects of house
prices on both groups. Meanwhile, I can get implications of house prices and
borrowing constraint on China’s coresidence pattern.
To highlight the multiple links between house prices, savings and coresidence,
I make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, in consistent with the one-
child policy in China, each household has only one child and no fertility choice is
involved. Second, repeated home sales and housing rental market are not included
in this model7. Even though these two features on housing market may seem
unusual, there are several other papers adopt the same assumptions, such as Fang
et al. (2016). The model has two generations: parent (p) and children (k). The
timing is simple: at the beginning of period t, if adult child has not bought his
own house yet, he must decide between coresidence and buying. If coresidence,
adult child can live with his parent freely at period t, then he needs to decide
again between coresidence and buying at next period t + 1; if instead he decides
to buy his own house at period t, then he lives in that house until the last period
T. To make the model closer to reality, adult child has two choices regarding his
own house at last period T: he can leave his house to the grandchild as a bequest,
or he can sell the house and consume everything.
The life-time utility function of household i is given by:
7In urban China, about 15% households rent their houses, among which two thirds are
public rental housing (public rental housing is a form of subsidized rental housing provided by
government for the low-income people), therefore private rental housing represents a very small
share on Chinese housing market. On the other hand, due to the nascent nature of the Chinese
housing market, only 2% of the total housing stock in Urban China is accounted by repeated
home sales, thus repeated home sales is not included in the model.
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Vi =
7ÿ
t=1
—t≠1U
1
cti,p, h
t
i,p
2
+
T=12ÿ
t=1
—t≠1÷U
1
cti,k, h
t
i,k
2
;
where — is the discount factor, ÷ is the altruism parameter of parent. I assume
utility function takes the form of U(c, h) = “ c”” +(1≠“)h
”
” , where c is non-housing
consumption and h is housing consumption8. Household in the model is indexed
by i, and identified by four initial parameters: adult child’s initial income y1i,k
, old parent’s initial income y1i,p, old parent’s initial asset s0i,p , and old parent’s
house h¯i. Parent’s house h¯i is fixed for each household i and positively correlated
with parent’s income. At period 1, income profile (y1i,k, y1i,p, s0i,p) is realized, which
is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, with the correlation coe cient
between child and parent income fl and correlation coe cient between parent’s
income and parent asset flpa. Parents live for 7 periods, with each period equivalent
to 5 years; they start at age 45, retire at age 60, and die at age 80 with certainty.
Adult children live for 12 periods (T=12) : start from age 20, also die at age 80.
Since parent/children living together implies inconvenience or lack of privacy for
both, there is a disutility factor ⁄ in the case of coresidence: hti,p = hti,k = h¯i⁄ ,
⁄ > 1. With the above assumptions, the problem of owning housing at period t is
defined as following:
Vi = max{cti,k,sti,k,dti,hti}Tt=1,{cti,p,sti,}7t=1,,Gi,ÂTi,k
7ÿ
t=1
—t≠1
SWU“
1
cti,p
2”
”
+ (1≠ “)
1
hti,p
2”
”
TXV
+
12ÿ
t=1
—t≠1÷
SWU“
1
cti,k
2”
”
+ (1≠ “)
1
hti,k
2”
”
+ ÂTi,kŸ
1
hti,k
2”
”
TXV ;
8Unlike most literature on housing demand, housing in this paper is measured by housing
area rather than housing value.
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where
hti,p =
Y___]___[
h¯i if non≠ coresidence
h¯i/⁄ if coresidence
; hi,kt =
Y___]___[
hi,k if non≠ coresidence
h¯i/⁄ if coresidence
.
Here Ÿ is the altruistic parameter for housing bequest, and ÂTi,k is indicator for
the option of leaving bequest, with ÂTi,k = 1 representing adult children choosing
to leave his purchased house hi,k for grandchildren, whereas ÂTi,k = 0 representing
adult child selling the house rather than leaving it as a bequest for grandchild at
last period T . The first decision adult child needs to make is choosing the optimal
timing of housing purchase, which is dti, with dti = 0 representing not buying and
dti = 1 representing buying. The timing of housing purchase must be before t Æ 7,
since old parent will die after period 7. If adult child still has not owned his own
house at period 7, he will inherit his parent’s house h¯i and not buying at all.
Given the optimal timing of housing purchase, at period t, budget constraints are
as following:
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cti,p + sti,p = (1 + r)st≠1i,p + yti,p ≠Gi; t Æ 7
cti,k + sti,k + dtiP thi,k = (1 + r)st≠1i,k + yti,k +Gi; t Æ 7
Gi Ø ≠G¯; t Æ 7
cti,k + sti,k = (1 + r)sti,k + yti,k; t > 7
cTi,k + sTi,k = (1 + r)sT≠1i,k + yTi,k + P Thi,k; if ÂTi,k = 1
cTi,k + sTi,k = (1 + r)sT≠1i,k + yTi,k; if ÂTi,k = 0
sti,k Æ ≠(1≠ –)P thi,k; if dti = 1
P t = (1 + g)P t≠1; t Æ 7
P t = (1 + 2%)P t≠1; t > 7
Income grows with a fixed rate g, hence adult child’s income from period 1 to
period 8 is given by yt+1i,k = (1 + g) yti,k for 2 < t Æ 8; after period 8, adult child’s
retirement income is given by yti,k = Ëy8i,k for 9 Æ t Æ T , where Ë representing
replacement ratio. Parent’s income is such that: yt+1i,p = (1 + g)yti,p for t Æ 3, and
yti,p = Ëy3i,p for 4 Æ t Æ 7. In the budget constraint, – is minimum down-payment
ratio, P t is the fixed housing price at period t, which grows with the same rate as
household income g until period 7, then its growth rate drops to the steady state
level 2%9. Gi stands for intergenerational transfer, and it is the same amount each
period as long as t Æ 7. Note that the intergenerational transfer Gi can be both
positive (with positive meaning transfer is given from parent to adult child) and
negative ( meaning transfer from adult children to parent), but it has a lower limit
G¯, indicating transfer made from adult children to parent can be positive but with
limited amount. This assumption coincides with the fact that intergenerational
transfer in China from adult children to older parents are usually limited in value,
9There are two approaches to deal with housing price progress in this paper. The first is
assuming house price grows in same rate as household income before t Æ 7, and the growth
rate drops to 2% after t > 7; in which case the degree of housing a ordability is constant for
household because adult children can only buy houses before period 7. The second approach
is assuming housing price grows with the same rate (8%) of household income through adult
children’s entire life cycle. I will present the results of first approach in the main paper, and the
results of second approach can be found in section 6.
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however it can be a huge amount the other way around. In this model, household’s
asset includes both financial asset and housing asset. Thus adult children’s savings
at period t is defined as:
Y___]___[
saveti,k = sti,k ≠ st≠1i,k if dit = 0
saveti,k = sti,k ≠ st≠1i,k + P thi,k if dit = 1
.
2.4 Model Calibration
In this section, I discuss the choice of the parameters I used in the model, and
the calibration procedure. I then show the life-cycle profiles generated by the cal-
ibrated parameters. The model parameters are calibrated to the life cycle profiles
on coresidence, housing expenditure, savings rate and intergenerational transfer
using data from CHFS and CHARLS. I then conduct three policy experiments to
discuss the implications of changing down payment and housing prices on house-
hold saving and coresidence patterns.
2.4.1 Baseline Parameter
Now I introduce my choice of parameters, shown in table 2.4. Some parameters
I take directly from the pre-existing literature or from the data, and the remaining
parameters need to be calibrated using the data. Annual real household income
growth rate is taken to be 8%, which is calculated from survey data China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS) 10. The annual interest rate 4%, same as in Curtis, Lugauer
10The real household income growth rate is taken to be 8%, the same growth rate of real
housing price in China according to Fang (2015), since house prices and household income have
similar trend over the last decade. Plus, according to Song (2010), a 8% income growth rate is
within reasonable range. In this paper, household income contains both labor income and other
sources of income, such as transfer and capital return.
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and Mark (2015). The minimum down payment ratio as 30%, according to the
regulation in China’s housing mortgage market. The pension replacement rate i
set to be 35%, same as the replacement rate after adjusting for pension coverage
in Song and Yang(2010). From CHFS survey, I can only observe the individual
incomes of both adult children and parents when they live together, by calculating
which, I get the correlation coe cient between income(log) of parents and adult
children 0.21711, and I take this as the simulated target to get the correlation
coe cient between parent and adult children’s income. The mean (µk, µp, µa)
and standard deviation (‡k,‡p,‡a) of initial log-income of parent, log-income of
adult children and initial log-asset of parent are taken directly from CHFS urban
data. The correlation coe cient between parent’s (log) income and asset (flpa) is
taken from CHARLS urban sample, only including those whose children have not
been married yet at the survey year, so that the asset data can reflect the savings
parents have accumulated for the event of their children’s wedding.
With the means and standard deviations for children’s initial income as well
as parents’ initial income and asset, I draw a multivariate normal distribution to
pin down the initial income distribution among households, then given the fixed
income growth process and the rule of retirement income, I thus have the life-time
income profile for all households. The price index is calculated in the following
approach : P 1 =  y¯k
h¯
, where   = 6 stands for the average price-to-income ratio,
y¯k stands for the mean of child’s initial income, and h¯ denotes the mean housing
quantity measured from the data, which is 10 units, equivalent to 100 square
meters. The calibrated housing price index P 1 is not real housing prices, just
indexed prices to keep households facing certain level of price-to-income ratio.
11Using CHARLS data, individual incomes of both child and parent are reported in the
coresidence households, hence I can get the correlation coe cient for these households, but if
adult child and parents live apart, there is no way to determine their individual incomes. The
correlation between log-income of parent and children fl is treated as free parameter so that it
fits the correlation coe cient under coresidence in the calibration.
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Table 2.4: Exogenous Parameters
(Parameters taken from the previous literature or data)
Length of periods T 12
Annual interest rate r 4%
Down payment ratio – 30%
Annual income growth rate g 8%
Pension replacement rate Ë 35%
Mean of initial log-income for child (age 20 - 30) µk 10.77
Mean of initial log-income for parent (age 40 - 50) µp 10.7
Mean of initial log-asset for parent µa 12.46
Standard deviation of log-income for child ‡k 1.18
Standard deviation of log-income for parent ‡p 1.12
Standard deviation of log-asset for parent ‡a 1.54
Correlation coe cient between parent’s (log) income and asset flpa 0.327
Housing price index at initial period P 1 4
(P 1 = 5 converted to dollar is about 60 $ per square foot )
In the model, coresidence decision depends on parent’s initial housing condition,
because adult children are more likely to live with parents if their parents have big-
ger or better houses. CHFS data asks detailed questions about housing condition,
such as the floor area, the number of bedrooms, and the original cost of housing.
Due to the di culty of measuring housing quality, I use housing floor area as the
indicator for housing quantity, the variation in housing area is not very large, such
that the mean of housing area is 100 m2, and only about 5% households live in
houses larger than 200m2 12.
2.4.2 Calibrated Parameters and Predicted Life Cycle Profiles
Given the parameters in Table 2.4 and the life-cycle income process described
in section 2.4.1, I can simulate the model and generate life-cycle profiles for cores-
idence, housing expenditure, savings rate, and intergenerational transfer. The
12I categorize the households in four income quartiles, the mean of housing area within each
quantile (from low income to high income quantile) are 112, 118, 125, 130 square meters respec-
tively.
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calibration aims to fit 33 moments from the data: the mean of coresidence rate
for each period (there are 7 periods in total), the mean of housing value-to-income
ratio for each period, the life cycle savings rate for both coresidence and non-
coresidence households, the ratio of average intergenerational transfer over par-
ent’s initial income for 4 income quantiles, and the correlation coe cient between
log-income of parent and children under coresidence.
There are 7 parameters that needed to be calibrated: the time discount factor —,
disutility factor of coresidence ⁄, utility coe cient of consumption “, the measure
for elasticity of substitution ”, parent’s altruistic parameter ÷, bequest parameter
Ë and the log-income correlation between parents and children under coresidence.
Table 2.5 reports the parameters that I calibrated by matching certain moments
from data.
Figure 2.5: Model-Predicted and Actual Life Cycle Patterns
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Table 2.6: Estimated Parameters
Discount factor — 0.99
Relative importance of non-housing “ 0.75
Elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption 11≠” 0.55
Parent’s altruism ÷ 0.80
Disutility of coresidence ⁄ 2.43
Bequest parameter Ë 1.43
Income correlation between children and parent fl 0.37
This exercise is to check the performance of the calibration model by showing the
contrast of simulated results and data moments. Also it is useful to provide some
intuition for the theoretical model and relevant policy experiments. Figure 2.5
presents the simulation results on life-cycle profiles : life-cycle coresidence pattern
(upper left plot ), life-cycle profile on housing expenditure that measured by house
value-to-income ratio (upper right plot), life-cycle savings rate profile for cores-
idence household (middle left), life-cycle savings rate profile for non-coresidence
household (middle right), and the intergenerational transfer conditional on par-
ent’s income quartile (bottom right plot). The model is able to generate life cycle
patterns quite comparable to the data, except for a few discrepancies. The model-
generated coresidence pattern has a downward trend over time, but with a slower
convergence rate. The model-generated house value-to-income ratio has a similar
trend to the data over life cycle, but it is slightly higher for the middle-aged house-
holds. The model-generated age-savings profile for non-coresidence household has
lower savings rates at later stages of life. The model-generated intergenerational
transfer is lower than the data for the low and middle income households. In
general, the fit between model and data is quite close, so this model is suitable to
analyze the implications of credit constraint on life-cycle profiles.
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2.5 Policy Experiments
One of the goals of this paper is to separate the e ects of housing price and
financial constraint (down payment) on savings rate as well as household structure,
so that the possible channel of housing condition a ecting household saving would
be identified. In this section, I conduct three counterfactual policies. Policy one:
lower the downpayment ratio from 30% to 20% and keep other parameters the
same; Policy two: lower the housing prices by half and keeping down payment
and other parameters the same time; Policy three: lower price by half and drop
down-payment ratio to 20%, so that households face house price-to-income level
and down payment ratio similar to that of the United States. For each policy I
simulate a set of predicted moments of life-cycle profiles, and then compare the
results to those of the baseline moments 13.
2.5.1 Policy One: Lower Downpayment Ratio from 30% to 20%
In baseline model, there are two sources causing housing a ordability issue: high
downpayment ratio and high housing prices. This policy focus on the e ects of
downpayment ratio only. When down payment is dropped from 30% to 20% 14,
by fig. 2.6, coresidence rate over life cycle barely dropped at all. In this case,
housing price is still extremely high, lowering down-payment alone is not enough
to mitigate the financial burden, thus young adult would not change the optimal
timing of housing purchase very drastically. Another interesting point captured
from this experiment is that down-payment ratio decrease has very little e ect on
savings rate of coresidence household, but it has bigger impact on non-coresidence
13I use the same household income draws in the baseline and policy simulations.
14Here setting 20% downpayment ratio aims to implicitly compare the housing market of
China and United States.
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household especially in early period, see fig 2.6. The greater impact of down
payment on non-coresidence household is not surprising, because now the share
of housing asset accumulated in early stage is decreased due to the decreased
minimum down payment requirement. This indicates that when housing price
is very high (the house value-to-income ratio is about 6 in this case), policies
designed to cut down payment would probably have limited impact on the housing
a ordability issue.
Figure 2.6: Policy One: Down Payment Drops from 30% to 20%
2.5.2 Policy Two: Lower House Price by Half
In this counterfactual experiment, down-payment remains 30%, and the housing
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price decreases by half, which results the house value-to-income ratio dropping to
3. As you can see, the decreasing housing price has significant impact on the
savings rate of both coresidence household and non-coresidence household over
life cycle, and the e ect is greater when household is at early stages of life cycle.
On average, the savings rate of coresidence household dropped by 27%, and the
savings rate of non-coresidence household dropped by 32%. In this experiment,
cheaper housing indicates that parents need to save less for transfer purpose,
which is verified in fig 2.7 (bottom right figure of intergenerational transfer). On
the other hand, adult children are less financially constrained, they don’t have to
reduce consumption severely to ease the pressure of housing purchase. Moreover,
because housing asset is included in household saving by definition, hence lowering
housing price would lead to lower housing asset, then leading to lower saving of
household. The lowering housing asset can be verified by the decreased house
value-to-income ratio profile in fig. 2.7 (upper right figure).
2.5.3 Policy Three: Lower House Price by Half and Drop Downpayment
Ratio from 30% to 20%
There have been popular concerns that if the housing bubble bursts in China,
the Chinese economy will be severely damaged. Whether the rapid housing price
appreciation represents housing bubble is not an issue in this paper, instead, this
counterfactual analysis focus on the e ects of housing price depreciation on the
living arrangements as well as savings behavior at household level. In this policy
experiment, I relax the credit constraint by decreasing the down payment ratio and
housing price at the same time. The purpose of this counterfactual experiment is
to simulate life-cycle profiles on savings rate and coresidence when housing market
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Figure 2.7: Policy Two: Housing Price Decreases by Half
condition is similar to that of the U.S. housing market15. Figure 2.8 shows that the
coresidence rates declined in all periods compared to baseline model. However,
comparing to the life cycle coresidence profile of United States, see fig 2.9, the
simulated coresidence in this case is still higher than that of U.S. over life cycle.
There are several possible explanations for this situation. Because the model does
not include repeated home sales, people probably want to buy houses later so that
they can enjoy bigger or better houses. Secondly, since rental housing is not part
of the endogenous housing choice in the model, young adults would have no choice
but to live in parent’s houses, until they save enough and buy homes themselves.
If the model is expanded and includes home resales/renting, then the life cycle
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Figure 2.8: Policy Three: Housing Price Decreases by Half and Down
Payment Drops to 20%
coresidence pattern might be fully explained.
Compared to counterfactual experiment 2, when both house price and down
payment ratio are decreased simultaneously, the savings rates over life cycle de-
crease even more. On average, the savings rate of coresidence household dropped
by 32%, and the savings rate of non-coresidence household dropped by 39%. The
main take-away from this experiment is that the e ect of housing price and finan-
cial constraint (caused by down-payment) on household savings rate is too big to
be neglected. Therefore, we can say with confidence that housing is indeed one of
the most important motives for saving.
15In U.S., the house price-to-income ratio for the middle-income group is about 3, and mini-
mum down payment ratio is about 20%.
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Figure 2.9: Coresidence over Life Cycle When Housing Market in China
is Comparable to U.S
2.6 Alternative Calibration Using A Di erent Housing Price
Appreciating Trend
Up to this point, the housing price appreciation is assumed to follow the same
trend as the household income growth over life-cycle. With this assumption, the
investment return from buying houses will not be blown out of all proportion,
and households can behave rationally. Now I provide another approach for model
calibration, which entertains the possibility of housing bubble. In this scenario,
house prices increase at a steady rate 8%, and this trend will last forever, thus
buying houses promises huge returns for households. This assumption will change
age-savings pattern drastically, since capital returns usually decrease households
savings. On the other hand, the coresidence pattern will also be di erent, because
households now need to consider the tradeo  between credit constraint and future
housing returns.
The procedure of calibration is very similar to that of section 2.4. I use the same
parameters from table 2.4 to pin down the household characteristic parameters,
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Table 2.8: Estimated Parameters
Discount factor — 0.99
Relative importance of non-housing “ 0.75
Elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption 11≠” 0.54
Parent’s altruism ÷ 0.89
Disutility of coresidence ⁄ 2.6
Bequest parameter Ë 1.25
Income correlation between children and parent fl 0.38
then simulate the model to fit exactly the same moments that depicting life cycle
behavior patterns. The seven parameters that needed to be calibrated from the
simulation are presented in table 2.6. The comparison between model simulated
life cycle profiles and data is shown in figure 2.10.
There are three discrepancies suggesting the model does not fit the data quite
well. Firstly, the model-simulated life cycle coresidence profile presents an uneven
pattern. At the first period, the coresidence rate is extremely high, because only
the richest households choose to buy houses. Next, there is a sudden big drop in
coresidence rate at the second period, but after that the coresidence rate decreases
slowly over time. In order to enjoy a higher housing asset return, people want to
buy houses as early as possible, but at the same time they also want bigger houses
since home resale is not allowed in the model. As a result, these two conflicting
e ects give rise to the simulated coresidence profile. The second significant dis-
crepancy comes from the simulated age-savings profile for coresidence households,
which is closely related to the coresidence pattern. In the beginning, only the rich
young adults who are not financially constrained choose to buy houses, hence the
savings rate is low; during later stages, the promised high capital returns moti-
vate the lower-income/middle-income households save more, because they want
to buy bigger houses, thus leading to an inverted “U” shaped pattern. Lastly,
the model-simulated age-savings profile for non-coresidence housesholds is quite
di erent from the data : it has a big spike at the second period, and then quickly
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drops to a much lower level. The sudden jump in savings rate at second period
is caused by the fact that about half households buy homes during that time,
thus leading to a rapid increase of housing assets; after the second period, non-
coresidence households save less due to the anticipation of future capital returns.
Figure 10 suggests that a life cycle model with housing bubble does not fully or
accurately capture the features of household’s saving and housing behavior.
Figure 2.10: Alternative Model-Predicted and Actual Life Cycle Patterns
2.7 Conclusion
This paper concerns two interesting facts of Chinese urban household’s living
arrangement and savings behavior: the high savings rate (especially that of the
young household), as well as the common situation of coresidence. Some papers
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have tried to understand China’s puzzling age-savings profile as the result of co-
hort, policy or culture e ects. This paper quantifies the life cycle e ects of housing
savings motive on household savings rate by using a dynastic model which includes
endogenous choices on coresidence and intergenerational transfer, credit constraint
resulting from housing market condition.
There are three possible channels in which housing market condition might be
important in explaining the high household savings rate in China. The first chan-
nel is through household living arrangement, more precisely, through coresidence.
It is not uncommon for adult children to live with parents when financial burden
of housing purchase is severe. Due to the consistent housing price appreciation
in China, more than half of population has housing a ordability problems. The
down payment alone would require about two years of household income, thus
coresidence provides a cheaper way of living, which indicates adult children can
save more when living with parents. The positive correlation between coresidence
and savings rate is examined in section 2.3, see table 2.3. The quantitative model
provides a better understanding of the inter-relationship between coresidence and
saving. According to the counter experiments in section 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, we can see
that both coresidence and savings rate decreased as a result of decreasing housing
price and down payment ratio, confirming the link between coresidence and high
savings rate under the context of high housing price.
The second channel is through intergenerational transfer. Survey data of CHARLS
(2013) gives indisputable evidence of intense transfer from parents to adult chil-
dren for housing purchase motive (measured by wedding gift). When housing price
is remarkably high, parents also need to save more in order to realize the heavy
transfer, thus implying elevated savings rate among households. However, this
transfer might happen for other reasons, such that altruism culture or tradition
dictates that parents transfer a lot to children. But the simulated model supports
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the hypothesis of transfer for housing purposes: the intergenerational transfer de-
creased greatly for all income-quartiles household when housing price decreases by
half.
The last channel for housing motive a ecting savings rate is through credit con-
straint: adult children are forced to save more so that they can pay for the down
payment and mortgage. In the simulated experiment, when the minimum down
payment ratio decreased from 30% to 20%, savings rate of household decreases
under non-coresidence in early life cycle, but stays roughly the same under cores-
idence, which implies that down payment alone has limited influence over savings
rate; However, when both down-payment and housing price are decreased, house-
hold savings rate decreases greatly over life cycle. This means that savings rate is
indeed significantly a ected by housing market condition, especially when credit
constraint exists. This paper provides a simple life cycle framework to examine the
influence of housing motive on household savings rate, which proves to be e ective
in separating the e ects of housing price under di erent household structures.
Finally, even though this paper focuses on evidence from urban China, its basic
mechanism can be applied to other countries as well. During Japan’s housing
bubble period in 1980s, there was a trend of rising household savings rate ac-
companied by rising coresidence rate. Adults living with older parents are quite
common in Asian countries, such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Many ar-
gued that the high coresidence rates in these countries are deeply rooted in the
cultural background that filial piety or parental respect holds great value, however,
in modern economy, the economic motivation can never be separated from social
and cultural environment. This paper gives another perspective that integrates
household structure and economic incentive.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A1
Proof of proposition 1: I begin by solving the final goods sector’s problem. Since
the final good is perfectly competitive and its price is normalized to 1, given the
price pji of intermediate good i in city j, the following problem solves for the
demand of intermediate good i :
max
yji
Aˆ
iœœj
y◊jidi
B1/◊
≠
ˆ
iœœj
pjiyjidi;
The demand equations of variety i derived from first order conditions are
pji =
A
Yj
yji
B1≠◊
. (2.7.1)
According to the intermediate goods production function (1.3.3), the marginal
cost of intermediate goods production is wjq“ji , then profit maximization yields the
optimal pricing rule
pji =
1
◊
wj
q“ji
, (2.7.2)
where 1◊ equals the mark-up factor. Together with (A.1) an (A.2), the intermediate
good output yji is
yji =
A
wj
◊q“ji
B 1
◊≠1
Yj. (2.7.3)
Replacing yji =
3
wj
◊q“ji
41/(◊≠1)
Yj into final good production function (1.3.3), the
wage rate of city j is:
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wj = ◊Q“j (2.7.4)
This expression implies that the equilibrium wage increases with city-specific pro-
ductivity, thus the city with more skilled entrepreneurs and more intensive in-
novation activities has a higher wage. Rewriting the intermediate good demand
function (A.3) with wage equation (A.4), the output of intermediate good is
yji =
A
qji
Qj
B1/◊
Yj. (2.7.5)
Combine final good production function and (A.5), together with the labor market
clearing condition Lj =
´
iœœj ljidi, the aggregate output in city j is
Yj = Q“jLj. (2.7.6)
Now it is time to solve for entrepreneur’s profit function. Taking advantage of
(A.2), (A.3) , (A.4) and (1.4.6), the expected profit from selling variety for en-
trepreneur i in city j is:
E (fiji | z) = 1≠ ◊
◊
wj
q“ji
A
wj
◊q“ji
B 1
◊≠1
Yj = (1≠◊)Yj
z
Qj
A
„ji + –≠ 1
–≠ 1
B
. (2.7.7)
Hence proposition 1 is proved.
APPENDIX A2
Proof of proposition 2: Suppose when an entrepreneur’s productivity level is
equal to z¯ , his indirect utility from living in city 1 and city 2 are the same,
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meaning
 1z¯ ≠ a1 =  2z¯ ≠ a2,
For any constant number ⁄ > 0, the following equation holds:
⁄z¯ ( 1 ≠ 2) = ⁄ (a1 ≠ a2) .
If ⁄ > 1, then there is
⁄z¯ ( 1 ≠ 2) > (a1 ≠ a2)
∆  1 (⁄z¯)≠ a1 >  2 (⁄z¯)≠ a2.
which means when an entrepreneur’s productivity is ⁄z¯, for any ⁄ > 1, his net
profit in city 1 is higher than that of city 2, thus he will choose to locate in the big
city. Similarly, if 0 < ⁄ < 1, then for an entrepreneur with productivity of ⁄z¯, his
net profit in city 1 is smaller than that of city 2, thus he will locate at the small
city.
APPENDIX A3
Proof of proposition 4: According to section 1.2.7, the skill sorting threshold is
z¯ = a1≠a2 1(Q1)≠ 2(Q2) , with
 j (Qj) =
1
÷j
A
◊
uú + aj
B µ
1≠µ
SU “–
(–≠ 1) ≠ 2
A
“‰j
(–≠ 1)
B1/2TVQ “µ+µ≠11≠µj =  jQ “µ+µ≠11≠µj .
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In addition, equation (1.4.16) suggests that city jÕs productivity is an increasing
function of the skill sorting threshold z¯, such that ˆQi(z¯)ˆz¯ > 0. Rewrite the skill
sorting threshold expression:
z¯ = a1 ≠ a2
 1Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
1 ≠  2Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
2
= 1
(Q2 (z¯))
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
a1 ≠ a2
 1
1
Q1
Q2
(z¯)
2 “µ+µ≠1
1≠µ ≠  2
. (2.7.8)
We know from (1.4.16) that the relative productivity Q1Q2 is an increasing function
of the skill sorting threshold z¯:
ˆ
1
Q1
Q2
(z)
2
ˆz¯ > 0. Then expression (A.8) indicates that
threshold z¯ increases in aggregate distribution’s minimum productivity threshold
zmin, such that ˆz¯ˆzmin > 0. Hence the relative productivity is also increasing in
minimum productivity threshold zmin:
ˆ
1
Q1
Q2
2
ˆzmin
> 0.
This positive relationship indicates that TFP growth reinforces the skill sorting
process, making the big city relatively more productive than the small city. Nest,
I analyze the e ects of locational fundamentals on skill sorting threshold. Since
 1 = 1÷1
1
◊
uú+a1
2 µ
1≠µ
5
“–
(–≠1) ≠ 2
1
“‰1
(–≠1)
21/26
is decreasing in ‰1 , ÷1 and a1, and it is
independent in z¯, then equation (A.8) can generate the following results:
ˆz¯
ˆ‰1
> 0, ˆz¯
ˆ÷1
> 0 and ˆz¯
ˆa1
> 0.
A higher threshold z¯ indicates stronger skill sorting e ects, and a higher relative
productivity Q1Q2 accordingly. Meanwhile the city-specific wage rate is an increasing
function of city productivity, see (1.4.3). Therefore, the relative wage rate between
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the two cities w1w2 also rises with the sorting threshold. In summation:
Q1
Q2
ø and w1
w2
ø if ‰1 ø or ÷1 ø or a1 ø
Now, let’s examine the change in relative population density L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
:
L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
=
3
w1
w2
4 µ
1≠µ (uú + a2)
1
1≠µ
(uú + a1)
1
1≠µ
. (2.7.9)
We know an increase in ‰1 or ÷1 lead to an increase in w1w2 , then the relative
population density L1/H¯1
L2/H¯2
also increases with an increase in ‰1 or ÷1. But the
e ect of a1 on L1/H¯1L2/H¯2 is ambiguous.
APPENDIX A4
Proof of proposition 6: According to section 1.3, the skill sorting threshold is
z¯ú = a1≠a2
Œ˜1(Q1)≠Œ˜2(Q1) , with
Œ˜j (Qj) =
“
÷j
A
◊
uú + aj
B µ
1≠µ
SU–≠ 1 + —j
(–≠ 1) ≠ 2
A
‰—j
“ (–≠ 1)
B 1
2
TVQ “µ+µ≠11≠µj .
where —j = z¯jz¯j+c stands for the local learning opportunity. For simplicity, let
Œ˜j (Qj) =  ˜jQ
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
j .
Then simple algebra indicates that ˆ ˜jˆ—j > 0. In addition, equation (1.5.5) suggests
that city jÕs average productivity is an increasing function of the skill sorting
threshold z¯ú, such that ˆQi(z¯ú)ˆz¯ú > 0. Furthermore, the relative productivity
Q1
Q2
is
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also an increasing function of the skill sorting threshold z¯ú:
ˆ
1
Q1
Q2
(z¯ú)
2
ˆz¯ú
> 0.
Rewrite the skill sorting threshold expression:
z¯ú = a1 ≠ a2
 ˜1Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
1 ≠  ˜2Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
2
= 1
Q
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ
2
a1 ≠ a2
 ˜1Q1Q2
“µ+µ≠1
1≠µ ≠  ˜2
. (2.7.10)
If information technology and cities are complement, then a drop in c will lead
to a greater improvement in big city’s learning opportunity, such that——1 > ——2.
Therefore, there is — ˜1 > — ˜2 in this case, which means the equilibrium skill
sorting threshold decreases as c decreases:
ˆz¯ú
ˆc
> 0.
If information technology and cities are substitute, then a drop in c will lead to
a greater improvement in small city’s learning opportunity, such that ——1 < ——2.
Therefore, there is — ˜1 < — ˜2 in this case, which means the equilibrium skill
sorting threshold increases as c decreases:
ˆz¯ú
ˆc
< 0.
The above di erentiated results suggest that information technology can cause
substantial changes to city’s skill compositions. Because the way people interact
with each other as well as its relationship with geography can be quite important in
terms of economic development and economic activity distribution across space.
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Appendix A5
Proof of proposition 7: The goods market clearance condition imply the local ag-
gregate output Yj is the sum of labor income wjLj , entrepreneurial profit from do-
mestic market (1≠◊)
1
◊
wj
21/“
QjYj and export profit (1≠◊)
1
1
·jn
21/“ 1 ◊
wj
21/“
QjYn,
hence we have
(1≠◊)
A
◊
wj
B1/“
Qj
SUYj +
A
1
·jn
B1/“
Yn
TV+ wjLj = Yj; (2.7.11)
With factor market clearance condition (1.6.4), we can establish the relationship
between city-specific wage rate and average city productivity:
3
wj
◊
4 1
“ = Qj
SU1 + A 1
·jn
B 1
“ (·jn)
1
“ ≠ 1
(·nj)
1
“ ≠ 1
TV . (2.7.12)
Then the trade balance condition (1.6.6), goods market clearance condition (A.9)
and the wage equation (A.10) lead to the following conclusions:
wjLj = ◊Yj (2.7.13)
Y1
Y2
= w1L1
w2L2
= (·21)
1
“ ≠ 1
(·12)
1
“ ≠ 1
. (2.7.14)
Assuming asymmetric trade cost ·21 > ·12, if there is a proportional drop in
trade cost (namely ·ˆ12 = fl·12 , ·ˆ21 = fl·21 and 0 < fl < 1), then the relative
economy size becomes larger in response to the trade cost decline
Yˆ2
Yˆ1
= (·ˆ21)
1
“ ≠ 1
(·ˆ12)
1
“ ≠ 1
>
(·21)
1
“ ≠ 1
(·12)
1
“ ≠ 1
. (2.7.15)
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Due to the positive relationship between wage and productivity described in
(A.12), and the positive link between city size and wage rate presented in (1.4.12),
the relative productivity can be expressed as:
Q1
Q2
= (·12)
1
“
(·21)
1
“
C
÷1 (uúX + a1)
÷2 (uúX + a2)
D 1
“
SU(·21) 1“ ≠ 1
(·12)
1
“ ≠ 1
TV
1≠µ
“ +1
. (2.7.16)
where uúX is the equilibrium common utility of workers under the trade model,
such that w1
p1≠µ1j
≠ a1 = w2p1≠µh2 ≠ a2 = u
ú
X . Taking account of (A.15) and (A.16), there
is
Qˆ1
Qˆ2
= (·ˆ12)
1
“
(·ˆ21)
1
“
C
÷1 (uúX + a1)
÷2 (uúX + a2)
D 1
“
SU(·ˆ21) 1“ ≠ 1
(·ˆ12)
1
“ ≠ 1
TV
1≠µ
“ +1
>
Q1
Q2
. (2.7.17)
Therefore, the relative productivity between the large and small city increases
as the trade cost decreases. Since the relative productivity is increasing in the skill
sorting threshold z¯X , the negative relationship between skill sorting threshold z¯X
and trade cost is thereby proved. In addition, the equilibrium relative wage rate
w1
w2
also increases with a decrease in trade costs.
w1
w2
= ÷1 (u
ú
X + a1)
÷2 (uúX + a2)
SU(·21) 1“ ≠ 1
(·12)
1
“ ≠ 1
TV1≠µ . (2.7.18)
Equation (A.18) indicates that if trade costs decline, the new equilibrium relative
wage wˆ1wˆ2 is
wˆ1
wˆ2
= ÷1 (u
ú
X + a1)
÷2 (uúX + a2)
SU(·ˆ21) 1“ ≠ 1
(·ˆ12)
1
“ ≠ 1
TV1≠µ > w1
w2
. (2.7.19)
The above proof means that when trade costs decline by the same percentage
in the two cities, the sorting threshold increases accordingly, so are the relative
productivity and relative wage.
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